Employment Discrimination

“[The employee’s] claim that she was temporarily totally disabled for the purposes of private disability benefits is not inconsistent with the claim that she could work if provided an accommodation. . . . [Plaintiff argued that] the definition of ‘qualified individual’ in the ADA was not incompatible with the definition of ‘disabled’ within the

“[Defendant] also contends that a written job description in this case establishes that the essential functions of [the employee’s] duties include lifting and pushing more than ten pounds. While written job descriptions warrant deference, ‘this deference is not absolute,’ and we must ask ‘whether the employer actually requires employees in the position to perform the

“At oral argument, counsel for [Defendant] suggested we reject the [Plaintiff]’s evidence as self-serving. But this is summary judgment, and we may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, — F. App’x —, 2016 WL 5939424, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016) (internal citations

“‘Fact-finders must determine whether a function is ‘essential’ on a case-by-case basis.’ [The employee] testified she couldn’t ‘remember having to lift more than 10 pounds’ as part of her duties, and her colleague . . . has provided a detailed affidavit that, if true, establishes that such exertions are virtually never required. While [Defendant]’s witnesses

“In Plaintiff’s Third Amended and Restated Complaint, Plaintiff adds the allegation that she ‘required the cane to perform the tasks within the course and scope of employment at Defendant’s facility.’ Thus, unlike the complaint in Mora, Plaintiff is specifically alleging that she suffered from an impairment to a major life activity by requiring a cane

“A claim is considered exhausted if is within the scope of the EEOC complaint and reasonably expected to grow out of a charge of discrimination. In examining a Title VII or ADEA action, the Court’s inquiry is not…limited to the exact charge [of discrimination]. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a Title VII plaintiff is

“In light of Pate’s wrongful interpretation and application of its Policy, and its failure to discharge a younger driver with four violations in a two-year period, a reasonable jury could disagree that Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s discharge was the true or real reason for terminating him, and find that the stated reason was pretext

“Although this evidence on its own likely would not support an inference of pretext, a rational juror could conclude that [Defendant’s] failure to re-hire these employees on a full-time basis further weakens the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered rationale for not hiring [Plaintiff], thus buttressing a reasonable inference that the failure to rehire [Plaintiff] was based

“[W]e have recognized that subjective hiring criteria “ ‘provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination’ because the criteria itself may be pretext for age discrimination.” Id. at 11, citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.1993)).

 

 

Stennett v. Tupelo

“In the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that (a) they are members of a protected class; (b) they were subjected to intentional discriminatory treatment during their employment with SLU; (c) similarly situated white employees were treated differently; (d) they were terminated due to their race; (e) Gandolfo was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was willfully