“[D]espite there being instances, such as in Section 12.1056(d), where an open- enrollment charter school is treated in the same manner as a school district, nothing in the Texas Education Code or the common law dictates that open-enrollment charter schools and school districts are universally equivalent.”
“Section 7.057(a)(2)(B) sets forth the process by which
“[The investigator] testified that a portion of the hours she found Dow to have been overbilled was in the form of employees arriving late, leaving early, and taking breaks. (Id. at pp. 113—15). [The investigator] stated that the contract between Axion and Dow did not permit Axion to bill Dow for its employees’ breaks.
“[Plaintiff] testified that [manager] Young instructed her to refuse [the customer’s] attempted return, and that she was disciplined for doing just that. [Plaintiff] explained that [customer] requested her termination, and that [manager] Young responded “don’t you worry sir. I’m fixing to take care of her right now.” And according to [customer], his complaint to co-manager
Plaintiff’s earnings prior to her employment with Defendant are not relevant to this cause of action. Therefore, the temporal scope of the financial information relevant to Plaintiff’s case is limited to the time period during and after her employment with Defendant. Because Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in June of 2014, only Plaintiff’s earnings (and
These statements are clearly sexual in nature and are significantly less ambiguous than the “jealousy” remark that the court relied on in La Day. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Salinas, a reasonable jury could conclude that Castillo’s sexually charged comments and inappropriate touching of Salinas indicate legitimate sexual
We conclude that Vallejo met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. The only evidence offered, TVC’s evidence, showed that Vallejo, age sixty, was replaced by someone who—although at fifty-one within the protected class—was “substantially younger.” See Agoh, 992 F.Supp.2d at 740. TVC did not present evidence negating these
“Although this evidence on its own likely would not support an inference of pretext, a rational juror could conclude that [Defendant’s] failure to re-hire these employees on a full-time basis further weakens the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered rationale for not hiring [Plaintiff], thus buttressing a reasonable inference that the failure to rehire [Plaintiff] was based
“[W]e have recognized that subjective hiring criteria “ ‘provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination’ because the criteria itself may be pretext for age discrimination.” Id. at 11, citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.1993)).
Stennett v. Tupelo
“This court has held that an employer’s reliance on “previously unmentioned” job requirements can raise a “genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.” Id. at 11, citing Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir.2010). Plaintiff was able to point to evidence that the “proffered reason for hiring [an] Assistant
“Although…individual principals had the ultimate power to decide whom to interview, the record nevertheless supports a finding that the individual principals conferred in deciding not to interview [Plaintiff].” Id. at 10.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]…we conclude that a jury reasonably could determine that it was not a mere
