Colin Walsh
Texas Employer Lawyer Colin Walsh

On December 18, 2020, I published a blog all about 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981” or “Section 1981”) claims.  I’m sure you remember it.  It was pretty great, if I do say so myself.  

But just in case, very briefly, § 1981 prohibits race discrimination

Let’s say you have been discriminated against based on your race, but either work for a company with less than 15 employees or are an independent contractor.  You know that neither Title VII nor the Texas Labor Code applies to you.  Is there any other protection?  YES! The answer is 42 U.S.C. §1981.

Let’s say you are an employee of a company with 15 or more people, but that you didn’t hire a lawyer until well after the 300-day statute of limitations for Title VII to assert your race discrimination claim.  Do you have any hope? YES! The answer is 42 U.S.C. §1981.

So, what is 42 U.S.C. § 1981?

42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits race discrimination and retaliation in the making and enforcing of contracts. It is meant to provide “broad and sweeping” protection against all race discrimination.  Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1975). According to the Supreme Court, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 is derived, “was designed to prohibit all racial discrimination . . . with respect to the rights enumerated therein.”  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-36 (1968).


Continue Reading Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination and retaliation in contracts, including race-based interference in contracts.

“In the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that (a) they are members of a protected class; (b) they were subjected to intentional discriminatory treatment during their employment with SLU; (c) similarly situated white employees were treated differently; (d) they were terminated due to their race; (e) Gandolfo was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was willfully

“A reasonable jury could conclude from [plaintiff’s supervisor’s] explanation, together with the summary judgment evidence that Plaintiff’s’ co-worker, Clark, also did not strictly follow TDCJ’s timesheet policy as written, that [employer’s] timesheet policy recognized a de facto exception for [public information officers].  If the de facto exception was selectively ignored in [plaintiff’s] case, a reasonable

“Kelvin Williams, a black male, was elected sheriff.  James Moore, a black male, became warden.  Shortly thereafter, Williams promoted another black female, with no college degree or counseling certification, to be the director of the male alcohol and drug program at the facility at a salary of $40,000 per year.  He appointed Jean Fair, a

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the Court finds that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact from which a jury could conclude that the harassment complained of was based on race.  Such a conclusion is underscored by the deposition testimony of Bell’s white co-worker,

“[T]he plaintiff has presented evidence of a pattern of race-based harassment, it is appropriate for the Court to consider incidents of non-race-based harassment. Compare EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (determining that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that a co-worker’s frequent banging on the glass

“Plaintiff argues that the changes to the vacancy notice regarding college graduation indicate the City’s true intent, which he claims was to hire a black police chief.  Plaintiff contends that the vacancy initially required applicants to graduate from a four-year university or college but was later changed so that African–Americans would qualify. ….  Plaintiff further

Under the “ultimatum” theory of constructive discharge, a plaintiff “must still show that ‘a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’  Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court rejected the employer’s argument “that [supervisor] lacked authority

“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).