“A claim is considered exhausted if is within the scope of the EEOC complaint and reasonably expected to grow out of a charge of discrimination. In examining a Title VII or ADEA action, the Court’s inquiry is not…limited to the exact charge [of discrimination]. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a Title VII plaintiff is

“He also offered evidence of a history of positive performance reviews, as well as the testimony of Major Robinson … Haverda highlights that the demotion memorandum does not explain how his performance was weaker than that of the other Jail Command Staff members, and that Sheriff Cutler could not explain this distinction during his deposition. 

“An employer may establish job requirements, and rely on them in arguing that a prima facie case is not established because the employee is not ‘qualified.’  However, only objective requirements may be used in making this argument.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (citing Medina v.

“The issue is not whether Haverda could have been demoted for the condition of the jail, but whether he would have been demoted if he had not engaged in protected activity.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 597 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“[Direct Supervisor’s] testimony rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] improperly documented her hours on the time sheets. [Direct Supervisor’s] testimony also rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] taking patient files home constituted a privacy violation.” …  “As for [employer’s] allegation that [employee] failed to attend a particular conference and notify her supervisors, [direct-supervisor] testified [that employee] did

“It is undisputed that, prior to [Plaintiff]’s reassignment, he held the position of Branch Chief…, and that, in this position, he supervised a staff of approximately fifteen, consisting of attorneys, paralegals, and a secretary.  It is also undisputed that, after [Plaintiff]’s February 2006 reassignment to the position of staff attorney for the Superfund legal branch,

“[T]he evidence shows a conflict regarding [decision-maker’s] stated reasons for not renewing [non-party witness’s] contract. (‘A court may infer pretext where a defendant has provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its conduct.’).”  “According to [non-party witness’s] testimony, when [decision-maker] notified her that that her contract was not being renewed, he said “due to the

“[T]he absence of any earlier criticism of [Plaintiff’s] work as Board attorney and the manner in which the Board selected [Plaintiff’s] replacement would suggest to a reasonable juror that the Board’s claimed reason for terminating [Plaintiff] was pretext.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir.

“When superintendent Pope informed the school board that an individual needs to be hired because a local organization “expressed concern about a lack of black workers the court held that “discriminatory animus of a manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the decisionmaker acted as a rubber stamp, or the cat’s paw, for

“Pace’s argument to the district court and throughout the trial was that she had five years of “warehouse experience,” if that undefined term was construed broadly, and that “[s]he was the best qualified.”*5 …In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience,