“He also offered evidence of a history of positive performance reviews, as well as the testimony of Major Robinson … Haverda highlights that the demotion memorandum does not explain how his performance was weaker than that of the other Jail Command Staff members, and that Sheriff Cutler could not explain this distinction during his deposition.  A reasonable jury could consider this evidence, along with Haverda’s other evidence, and find that Appellees failed to show that they would have terminated Haverda in the absence of the protected speech.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 598 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the Court finds that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact from which a jury could conclude that the harassment complained of was based on race.  Such a conclusion is underscored by the deposition testimony of Bell’s white co-worker, who testified that he “never heard [Lane] talk to the white salespeople like the black salespeople.  Definitely.  He never said the same things to us that he would say to the others.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).

“An employer may establish job requirements, and rely on them in arguing that a prima facie case is not established because the employee is not ‘qualified.’  However, only objective requirements may be used in making this argument.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2001)).  “That is, an employer cannot defeat summary judgment at the prima facie stage by claiming the plaintiff failed to meet entirely subjective hiring criteria. Medina, 238 F.3d at 681. …. The police chief requirements at issue have objective and subjective elements.  The vacancy stated, in relevant part, that applicants ‘should have ten years of pertinent experience, including supervisory experience as a division commander, assistant police chief or police chief.’ Doc. [40–6].  While the number of years required is objective, it appears that the City may have been able to make a quasi-subjective determination on whether an applicant’s experience is ‘pertinent.’…. Plaintiff is able to show, and the City does not challenge, that he satisfies the objective hiring criteria for the position.  Such is demonstrated by Plaintiff’s resume and deposition testimony summarizing his work experience and qualifications.”

Harstad v. City of Columbus, Miss., 2014 WL 4913966, at *3–4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“[T]he plaintiff has presented evidence of a pattern of race-based harassment, it is appropriate for the Court to consider incidents of non-race-based harassment. Compare EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (determining that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that a co-worker’s frequent banging on the glass partition of the plaintiff’s office was motivated by animus related to the plaintiff’s national origin because the same co-worker had repeatedly called the plaintiff “Arab” for approximately one year), with Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (declining to consider incidents of harassment not based on race where there was no evidence that the conduct was part of a pattern of race-based harassment). The Court finds that when evidence of Lane and Garafola’s race-based harassment of Bell is taken together with evidence of the non-race-based harassment, it is reasonable to conclude that the harassment complained of was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of Bell’s employment.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *10 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).

“A review of her pleadings reflects that [Employee] has alleged that she has worked for [Employer] since 1988, she encountered no problems in the workplace until she was listed as a witness in [Co-worker]’s complaint in July 2008, and, shortly after being listed as a witness in the legal action [Co-worker] filed in state court against [Employer] in March of 2010, [Employee] was subjected to adverse actions in retaliation for her involvement in the protected activity. At this stage of the litigation, accepting her allegations as true, [Employee] has stated a plausible claim of retaliation against [Employer] under Title VII.”

Slaughter v. College of the Mainland, 2014 WL 1917981, at *5  (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2014) (Froeschiner, J.).

“Defendants cite the following global statement in both declarations: ‘SDT did not fire anyone for complaining about not getting paid for all time worked.’  Neither [Defendant] mentions [Plaintiff] by name, nor do Defendants identify any other evidence to establish the basis for [Plaintiff’s] termination.  The Court finds this evidence insufficient to establish a legitimate, non-retaliatory justification for terminating [Plaintiff’]’s employment.”

Lackey v. SDT Waste and Debris Services, LLC, 2014 WL 3866465, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014) (Milazzo, J.).

“[T]he remarks appear to meet the other requirements of direct evidence.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 444 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Chapter 21 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.”  Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.106(a).  Women who were pregnant at, or very near the time of, an adverse employment action are members of the protected class, as are women who were on maternity leave, or who had recently returned to work at the time of the adverse action.  Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F.Supp.2d 137, 147 (N.D.N.Y.2008).…Thus, one of the primary issues presented in a case in which a woman is not pregnant at the time of an adverse employment action becomes where to “draw th[e] line.”  Id.  Accordingly, whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class in pregnancy discrimination cases is best determined on a “case-by-case basis.”  Helmes, 564 F.Supp.2d at 147. …KIPP terminated her employment on February 17, 2011, less than three months after she had returned from maternity leave, and KIPP does not dispute that it terminated her employment on this date.  Further, near the time Whitehead was hospitalized and absent from work from August to October, Carter discussed with Fimble terminating Whitehead’s employment and Whitehead’s pregnancy.  We conclude that Whitehead presented evidence establishing a prima facie case that she was a “member of the protected class” in regard to her sex-discrimination claim based on her pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical issues.  Her evidence that she returned to work from maternity leave on December 3, 2010 and KIPP terminated her employment less than three months later is sufficient to create a fact issue as to her membership in the protected class.  And the existence of this fact issue precludes the granting of KIPPS’s plea to the jurisdiction.”

KIPP, Inc. v. Whitehead, 2014 WL 3926562, at *6-7 (Tex. App. Aug. 12, 2014) (Jennings, J.).

“The issue is not whether Haverda could have been demoted for the condition of the jail, but whether he would have been demoted if he had not engaged in protected activity.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 597 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“Plaintiff argues that the changes to the vacancy notice regarding college graduation indicate the City’s true intent, which he claims was to hire a black police chief.  Plaintiff contends that the vacancy initially required applicants to graduate from a four-year university or college but was later changed so that African–Americans would qualify. ….  Plaintiff further contends that the selection process for police chief was tainted because the Mayor helped screen applications.  When asked during deposition, the Mayor denied being involved in the initial screening process.  Smith Dep. [34–1] at 6. The Chief Operations Officer testified at deposition that he made the decision to cut Plaintiff at the initial screening and that the Mayor was not involved in the decision.  Armstrong Dep. [34–2] at 5. However, Plaintiff submits a newspaper article from the relevant time period stating that the Mayor helped screen applications.  See Doc. [40–7].  Whether or not the Chief Operations Officer decided to cut Plaintiff’s application, he reported to the Mayor and so did other officials involved in the selection process for the new police chief.  The Mayor was included in the hiring process but was unable to vote for a candidate.  Smith Dep. [34–1] at 8–9.  The City Council consisted of six members, four were African–American and two were Caucasian.  Karriem Dep. [34–6] at 4.  The two Caucasian councilmen voted against hiring McQueen, and the four African–American councilmen voted in favor of hiring him.  Id. at 6.  ….  This rebuttal evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, calls into question the City’s proffered reason for not promoting or further considering Plaintiff for police chief.”

Harstad v. City of Columbus, Miss., 2014 WL 4913966, at *7–8 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014) (Brown, J.).