“Chapter 21 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.”  Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.106(a).  Women who were pregnant at, or very near the time of, an adverse employment action are members of the protected class, as are women who were on maternity leave, or who had recently returned to work at the time of the adverse action.  Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F.Supp.2d 137, 147 (N.D.N.Y.2008).…Thus, one of the primary issues presented in a case in which a woman is not pregnant at the time of an adverse employment action becomes where to “draw th[e] line.”  Id.  Accordingly, whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class in pregnancy discrimination cases is best determined on a “case-by-case basis.”  Helmes, 564 F.Supp.2d at 147. …KIPP terminated her employment on February 17, 2011, less than three months after she had returned from maternity leave, and KIPP does not dispute that it terminated her employment on this date.  Further, near the time Whitehead was hospitalized and absent from work from August to October, Carter discussed with Fimble terminating Whitehead’s employment and Whitehead’s pregnancy.  We conclude that Whitehead presented evidence establishing a prima facie case that she was a “member of the protected class” in regard to her sex-discrimination claim based on her pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical issues.  Her evidence that she returned to work from maternity leave on December 3, 2010 and KIPP terminated her employment less than three months later is sufficient to create a fact issue as to her membership in the protected class.  And the existence of this fact issue precludes the granting of KIPPS’s plea to the jurisdiction.”

KIPP, Inc. v. Whitehead, 2014 WL 3926562, at *6-7 (Tex. App. Aug. 12, 2014) (Jennings, J.).