“A reasonable jury could conclude from [plaintiff’s supervisor’s] explanation, together with the summary judgment evidence that Plaintiff’s’ co-worker, Clark, also did not strictly follow TDCJ’s timesheet policy as written, that [employer’s] timesheet policy recognized a de facto exception for [public information officers].  If the de facto exception was selectively ignored in [plaintiff’s] case, a reasonable jury could also conclude that [plaintiff’s] violation of [employer’s] timesheet policy was a pretext for [plaintiff’s] demotion.”

Lyons v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 2014 WL 4413259, at *2 (5th Cir. Sep. 9, 2014) (Davis, Dennis, and Costa, JJ.).

“Plaintiff contends that DHS, through its discrimination and harassment, constructively discharged him. Plaintiff resigned in September 2008. Given that it has determined that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, and in light of other conduct by Defendant’s employees, the court concludes that a genuine dispute of material exists as to whether a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign because working conditions have become so intolerable.”

Vasquez v. Johnson, 2014 WL 2438380, at * 17 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2014) (Lindsay, J.).

“[P]laintiff arranged for a substitute who voluntarily agreed to work [Plaintiff]’s shift that Sunday…. With a volunteer substitute available, [Defendant] would not have had to incur any cost requiring an employee to substitute for [Plaintiff], nor would [Defendant] necessarily be left short-handed.”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *7 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J.) (emphasis in original) (citing Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 839–40 (5th Cir. 2013).  The court found that the existence of a volunteer alone was sufficient evidence for the employer to make a reasonable accommodation: “Not only was [Plaintiff’s] ‘short period of absence’ minimal under Title VII, but [Plaintiff] … promised to report to work directly after the July 3rd event.”

Davis v. Fort Bend County, — F.3d –, 2014 WL 4209371, at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2014) (Prado, J.).

“As we have noted, while a showing that a plaintiff is clearly better qualified is one way of demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, it is not the only way … the question is whether the assessment, even if incorrect, was the real reason for the action.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 446 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.) (citations omitted).

“Kelvin Williams, a black male, was elected sheriff.  James Moore, a black male, became warden.  Shortly thereafter, Williams promoted another black female, with no college degree or counseling certification, to be the director of the male alcohol and drug program at the facility at a salary of $40,000 per year.  He appointed Jean Fair, a black female, to be assistant director, with a $35,000 salary.  Plaintiff, who was forced to reapply for her position with the new sheriff, formally requested a raise but was declined despite the fact that the raise would be fully funded by federal monies and would cost Bolivar County nothing….  The court finds that the plaintiff has set forth genuine issues of material fact including, but not limited to, whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her race in failing to pay her comparably to similarly-situated black employees.”

Lyons v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 2014 WL 4413259, at *1 (5th Cir. Sep. 9, 2014) (Davis, Dennis, and Costa, JJ.).

“In the interrogatories, Plaintiff states that Wood called him a “wetback”on five different occasions: (1) April 21, 2008; (2) May 29, 2008; (3) June 21, 2008; (4) July 10, 2008; and (5) August 8, 2008. Wood also told Plaintiff that “Salvadorans are liars” on July 8, 2008. Given the number of times these racial comments were made in a short, five-month period, the court determines that these actions amount to more than simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, and that a genuine dispute of material fact is established as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.”

Vasquez v. Johnson, 2014 WL 2438380, at * 17 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2014) (Lindsay, J.).

“A showing of sincerity, however, does not require proof that the July 3rd church event was itself a true religious tenet, but only that [Plaintiff] sincerely believed it to be religious in her own scheme of things.”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *4 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J.) (citing Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Davis v. Fort Bend County, — F.3d –, 2014 WL 4209371, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2014) (Prado, J.).

“After Lewis disagreed with Wood’s desire to Swafford, Wood repeatedly informed Lewis that he was violating federal law because Lewis was discriminating based on age and disability.  Also the record indicates that Hojem did not make any assurance to Wood regarding retaliation until weeks later—after Wood had already decided to interview Thomas, who he had previously not identified as a qualified applicant.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 445 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Here, [Employee] alleges two statements in particular as evidence of age discrimination. First, [employee] asserts that McKinley, during or immediately after [employee’s] termination, declared: ‘[G]o get a job as a Wal–Mart door greeter.’ Second, [employee] alleges that a fellow employee overheard McKinley say, on the day immediately following [employee’s] termination, ‘I’m the one that got rid of the old bastard.’ Even though [employee] concedes that Bunn was the supervisor who actually fired him, a reasonable juror could conclude, on this record, that McKinley had sufficient authority over the employment decision as well.”

Truelove v. Bolivar County, Miss., 2014 WL 4457314, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sep. 10, 2014) (Biggers, Jr., J.).

“While it is true that these statements are few in number, and that much of the meeting was spent discussing other subjects, their number does not strip the statements of their status as evidence.  After a court draws the negative inference that Sheriff Cutler was negatively referencing Haverda’s letter to the editor, the amount of time spent talking about the subject during the meeting becomes an issue for the fact-finder to weigh.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).