“[Plaintiff] claims his thought processes and memory were impaired following the accident because of the injuries he sustained in it. His testimony is corroborated by testimony from his wife and one co-worker. Because it is not disputed that [Plaintiff] sustained some injuries to his head, his claims are not intrinsically unbelievable. While the fact that [Plaintiff’s] explanation was rejected in the administrative proceedings weighs against his credibility, the determination of his claims will rise or fall with the jury’s evaluation of his credibility, and the credibility of other witnesses.”

Grimes v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2014 WL 2892407, at *4 (N.D. Miss. June 25, 2014) (Sanders, J.).

“The Fifth Circuit has suggested that an extended gap of time between the plaintiff engaging in a protected activity and an adverse employment action can cut against a finding of retaliation. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that an interval of several years between the adverse action and engaging in a protected activity may be evidence against retaliation). That said however, a five to six month time lapse does not negate a finding of causal connection as [Employer] suggests. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has found that fourteen months was not legally conclusive proof against retaliation.”

 

Crutchfield v. Railserve, Inc., 2014 WL 1831186, at *7 (M.D. La. May 88, 2014) (Brady, J.).

“Instead of giving [Plaintiff] light duty, [Defendant] provided the grocery department an additional thirty hours to allow [Plaintiff] to schedule employees to help him….  In spite of the additional hours, when sales were slower than anticipated, [Plaintiff] was instructed to cut hours…, resulting in the department being understaffed, leaving [Plaintiff] with no help and forcing him to work beyond the limitations set by his doctors.”

Garcia v. Randall’s Food and Drugs, L.P., 2014 WL 2931841, at *11 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (O’Connor, J.).

“There is no dispute that Lewis was Wood’s direct supervisor and was responsible for Wood’s performance evaluations and implementation of disciplinary actions…. Woods pay and any raises were merit-based and dependent on performance reviews done by Lewis.  There is additional evidence … that Lewis had refused to communicate with Wood and had removed some of his duties as a result of the feud.  All of this indicates that Lewis had influence or leverage over Wood’s decisionmaking.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 444 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Thomas need only show that Hill terminated him because of his actual or a perceived physical impairment, regardless of whether the impairment limits a major life activity.  Hill’s arguments to the contrary are simply wrong.  Thomas cannot meet his burden, however, if the impairment is “transitory and minor.”  Given the facts in this case, the Court finds that Thomas raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Hill regarded him as having a physical impairment and terminated him because of his impairment.  In Hill’s own letter, he refers to Thomas’ heart condition and the need for Thomas to find a less stressful job.  Further, contrary to Hill’s arguments, the Court cannot say that a heart condition resulting in triple by-pass surgery and rehabilitation is a transitory and minor impairment.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.) (emphasis in original).

“The district court’s belief that Appellees had established beyond dispute that they did not demote Haverda because of his speech has nothing to do with the qualified immunity defense.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“The content—support for Kaelin’s opponent—and form—participation in a PAC—of the speech at issue clearly support the notion that it involved matters of public concern, as we have previously held that there can be no question that . . . associating with political organizations and campaigning for a political candidate related to a matter of public concern.”  At *5 (quotations omitted).

Cox v. Kaelin, — Fed. Appx. –, 2014 WL 3866128, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (Clement, Graves, JJ.).

“[Defendant] argues…that it had an Equal Employment Opportunity policy, the jury could have believed…that the policy was not followed.  At trial, the jury heard evidence that in response to the EEOC’s request for information, [Defendant] produced affidavits stating that [Plaintiff] never complained….  The jury heard and saw evidence and testimony demonstrating that this was false.  [Plaintiff] testified that he had complained….  The jury also heard [a project manager] testify that he was in a hurry when he signed an admittedly false affidavit stating he never used the terms ‘güero’ or ‘wuedo’ in regards to [Plaintiff].”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *4 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

Under the “ultimatum” theory of constructive discharge, a plaintiff “must still show that ‘a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’  Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court rejected the employer’s argument “that [supervisor] lacked authority to make the final determination and that the [School] Board had not voted.”  Id.  Rather, a reasonable employee would be compelled to resign if “told that he would not be renewed.”

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“Here, the district court applied the stray remarks doctrine before determining whether the plaintiff had failed to produce substantial evidence of pretext and then refused to consider those remarks in determining pretext.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 443 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).