“Chapter 21 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.”  Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.106(a).  Women who were pregnant at, or very near the time of, an adverse employment action are members of the protected class, as are women who were on maternity leave, or who had recently returned to work at the time of the adverse action.  Helmes v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 564 F.Supp.2d 137, 147 (N.D.N.Y.2008).…Thus, one of the primary issues presented in a case in which a woman is not pregnant at the time of an adverse employment action becomes where to “draw th[e] line.”  Id.  Accordingly, whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class in pregnancy discrimination cases is best determined on a “case-by-case basis.”  Helmes, 564 F.Supp.2d at 147. …KIPP terminated her employment on February 17, 2011, less than three months after she had returned from maternity leave, and KIPP does not dispute that it terminated her employment on this date.  Further, near the time Whitehead was hospitalized and absent from work from August to October, Carter discussed with Fimble terminating Whitehead’s employment and Whitehead’s pregnancy.  We conclude that Whitehead presented evidence establishing a prima facie case that she was a “member of the protected class” in regard to her sex-discrimination claim based on her pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical issues.  Her evidence that she returned to work from maternity leave on December 3, 2010 and KIPP terminated her employment less than three months later is sufficient to create a fact issue as to her membership in the protected class.  And the existence of this fact issue precludes the granting of KIPPS’s plea to the jurisdiction.”

KIPP, Inc. v. Whitehead, 2014 WL 3926562, at *6-7 (Tex. App. Aug. 12, 2014) (Jennings, J.).

“The issue is not whether Haverda could have been demoted for the condition of the jail, but whether he would have been demoted if he had not engaged in protected activity.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 597 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“Plaintiff argues that the changes to the vacancy notice regarding college graduation indicate the City’s true intent, which he claims was to hire a black police chief.  Plaintiff contends that the vacancy initially required applicants to graduate from a four-year university or college but was later changed so that African–Americans would qualify. ….  Plaintiff further contends that the selection process for police chief was tainted because the Mayor helped screen applications.  When asked during deposition, the Mayor denied being involved in the initial screening process.  Smith Dep. [34–1] at 6. The Chief Operations Officer testified at deposition that he made the decision to cut Plaintiff at the initial screening and that the Mayor was not involved in the decision.  Armstrong Dep. [34–2] at 5. However, Plaintiff submits a newspaper article from the relevant time period stating that the Mayor helped screen applications.  See Doc. [40–7].  Whether or not the Chief Operations Officer decided to cut Plaintiff’s application, he reported to the Mayor and so did other officials involved in the selection process for the new police chief.  The Mayor was included in the hiring process but was unable to vote for a candidate.  Smith Dep. [34–1] at 8–9.  The City Council consisted of six members, four were African–American and two were Caucasian.  Karriem Dep. [34–6] at 4.  The two Caucasian councilmen voted against hiring McQueen, and the four African–American councilmen voted in favor of hiring him.  Id. at 6.  ….  This rebuttal evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, calls into question the City’s proffered reason for not promoting or further considering Plaintiff for police chief.”

Harstad v. City of Columbus, Miss., 2014 WL 4913966, at *7–8 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014) (Brown, J.).

 

“[Plaintiff] claims his thought processes and memory were impaired following the accident because of the injuries he sustained in it. His testimony is corroborated by testimony from his wife and one co-worker. Because it is not disputed that [Plaintiff] sustained some injuries to his head, his claims are not intrinsically unbelievable. While the fact that [Plaintiff’s] explanation was rejected in the administrative proceedings weighs against his credibility, the determination of his claims will rise or fall with the jury’s evaluation of his credibility, and the credibility of other witnesses.”

Grimes v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2014 WL 2892407, at *4 (N.D. Miss. June 25, 2014) (Sanders, J.).

“The Fifth Circuit has suggested that an extended gap of time between the plaintiff engaging in a protected activity and an adverse employment action can cut against a finding of retaliation. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that an interval of several years between the adverse action and engaging in a protected activity may be evidence against retaliation). That said however, a five to six month time lapse does not negate a finding of causal connection as [Employer] suggests. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has found that fourteen months was not legally conclusive proof against retaliation.”

 

Crutchfield v. Railserve, Inc., 2014 WL 1831186, at *7 (M.D. La. May 88, 2014) (Brady, J.).

“Instead of giving [Plaintiff] light duty, [Defendant] provided the grocery department an additional thirty hours to allow [Plaintiff] to schedule employees to help him….  In spite of the additional hours, when sales were slower than anticipated, [Plaintiff] was instructed to cut hours…, resulting in the department being understaffed, leaving [Plaintiff] with no help and forcing him to work beyond the limitations set by his doctors.”

Garcia v. Randall’s Food and Drugs, L.P., 2014 WL 2931841, at *11 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (O’Connor, J.).

“There is no dispute that Lewis was Wood’s direct supervisor and was responsible for Wood’s performance evaluations and implementation of disciplinary actions…. Woods pay and any raises were merit-based and dependent on performance reviews done by Lewis.  There is additional evidence … that Lewis had refused to communicate with Wood and had removed some of his duties as a result of the feud.  All of this indicates that Lewis had influence or leverage over Wood’s decisionmaking.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 444 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Thomas need only show that Hill terminated him because of his actual or a perceived physical impairment, regardless of whether the impairment limits a major life activity.  Hill’s arguments to the contrary are simply wrong.  Thomas cannot meet his burden, however, if the impairment is “transitory and minor.”  Given the facts in this case, the Court finds that Thomas raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Hill regarded him as having a physical impairment and terminated him because of his impairment.  In Hill’s own letter, he refers to Thomas’ heart condition and the need for Thomas to find a less stressful job.  Further, contrary to Hill’s arguments, the Court cannot say that a heart condition resulting in triple by-pass surgery and rehabilitation is a transitory and minor impairment.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.) (emphasis in original).

“The district court’s belief that Appellees had established beyond dispute that they did not demote Haverda because of his speech has nothing to do with the qualified immunity defense.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“The content—support for Kaelin’s opponent—and form—participation in a PAC—of the speech at issue clearly support the notion that it involved matters of public concern, as we have previously held that there can be no question that . . . associating with political organizations and campaigning for a political candidate related to a matter of public concern.”  At *5 (quotations omitted).

Cox v. Kaelin, — Fed. Appx. –, 2014 WL 3866128, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (Clement, Graves, JJ.).