“[T]he court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a causal connection between her request for FMLA-qualified leave and her termination, which was discussed with her a mere three days after her FMLA-qualified leave request.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“When superintendent Pope informed the school board that an individual needs to be hired because a local organization “expressed concern about a lack of black workers the court held that “discriminatory animus of a manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the decisionmaker acted as a rubber stamp, or the cat’s paw, for the subordinate employee’s prejudice.” Laxton v. GAP Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 584 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The relevant inquiry is whether Pope “had influence or leverage over” the LPSB’s decisionmaking.  See id. The jury could have inferred that Pope had influence or leverage over the LPSB based on Pope’s status as Superintendent and Pope’s acts of calling board members to press his recommendation.”

Pace v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 13-30919, 2014 WL 3973059, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (Higginbotham, Clement, and Higginson, JJ.).

“[I]n her response to [employer’s] motion for summary judgment, [employee] also pointed out that [employer] did not renew the contract of other female employees who had supported [employee’s] complaint during the investigation. . .  [a]s such, the district court’s analysis overlooks [employee’s] reliance on the termination of two other female employees who supported [her] complaint as evidence of pretext.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 336 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“The Court held the following to be issues of material fact based on Plaintiff’s and 3rd party affidavits: (1) discrepancy regarding who made the decision to terminate; (2) Plaintiff offering evidence that employees were undermining him while Defendant offers a company policy prohibiting discrimination; (3) Plaintiff’s claims of ‘phenomenal’ performance v. Defendant’s Affidavit’s claiming insubordination, etc. – all in addition to the reasons stated in the termination letter; (4) Plaintiff’s claims that white employees were purged from the workplace v. Defendant’s claims of having several white administrators.”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *6 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir. June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (Barksdale, Prado, and Haynes, JJ.).

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean the same thing as the power to hire and fire teachers.  The declarant was merely a school principal.  The court found that: “A jury could find that [the declarant] had sufficient influence.”

 

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“In determining if conduct is ‘severe and/or pervasive,’ the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  Stewart v. Caton, Civ. No. 13-823, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.) (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).  Defendants cite to numerous cases to illustrate [their] point, but as [Plaintiff] correctly points out, many of the cases to which Defendants cite may not be relied on because they come from jurisdictions outside of the Fifth Circuit and/or have been overruled.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).

“Plaintiff cites her email dated June 6, 2011, in which Plaintiff informed Coughlin-Rowley that she was scheduled for an eye surgery … Plaintiff also points to Coughlin-Rowley’s email exchange with Atkinson on June 7, 2011, wherein Coughlin-Rowley recommended that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated as of July 1, 2011 [specifically referencing] Plaintiff’s intention to undergo surgery in July, as well as her less than ideal performance.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“Pace’s argument to the district court and throughout the trial was that she had five years of “warehouse experience,” if that undefined term was construed broadly, and that “[s]he was the best qualified.”*5 …In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience, and found she did. They could have relied on her presentation of evidence … In addition, the jury received the testimony from Brent Bencaz, Pace’s supervisor, that he believed her to be qualified, and Terry Hughes’s testimony that Pace met the thirteen job criteria that she believed the position required. This testimony proved enough to convince the jury, and nothing in the record suggests that this decision was irrational or unreasonable.”

 

Pace v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 2014 WL 3973059, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (Higginbotham, Clement, and Higginson, JJ.).

“We think it significant that, although [decision-maker] refused to give [employee] any reason when he notified her that her contract was not being renewed, during the instant litigation [decision-maker] was able to supply a laundry list of reasons.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 335 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).