“[Plaintiff] testified that [Supervisor] repeatedly used racial epithets to refer to him, such as ‘güero,’ ‘mayate,’ and ‘ni – –er,’ even after [Plaintiff] requested not to be called those names.  Once, [Supervisor] told [Plaintiff]: ‘Get the f – – k away from me, I don’t want no mayate around while I’m eating.’  In addition, …[Plaintiff] was given extra duties because of his race.  For example, …[Plaintiff] was required to unload a truck by himself while his coworkers looked on.  [Plaintiff’s] boss…stated to his coworkers, ‘Let the mayate unload the bricks by himself.'”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.)

The Plaintiff “was informed that . . . his contract would not be renewed.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court notes that “an employee can prove constructive discharge with evidence that she was given an ultimatum requiring her to choose between resignation and termination.  Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997).”  Id. at *3.  The court found the supervisor’s act of informing Plaintiff that his contract would not be renewed was evidence of an ultimatum: “Lawson was allegedly given the ultimatum to resign or face non-renewal.”

 

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“[W]e agree with Ochoa that the evidence establishes a fact issue as to  and that these opportunities were denied or interfered with based on unlawful criteria… After Ochoa reported sexual harassment to Johnson, he discussed Ochoa’s sexual harassment allegations with … Guerra … Guerra then directed Johnson to end Ochoa’s assignment at UTEP on the grounds that she was not meeting performance standards.”

Ochoa v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 410 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. App.—El Paso, pet filed March 14, 2014).

“After describing statements in an email exchange about terminating plaintiff and how hard on business a sales’ rep’s extended medical leave can be, the court concludes, ‘These statements, in conjunction with Lentin’s testimony [about how the job did not have to be eliminated] and the plain language of the November 19 confidential letter, suggest that … Plaintiff’s continued role as IC manager was not definitely slated to end on July 1, 2011. This evidence, in conjunction with the temporal proximity … is sufficient.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“Admittedly, Thomas has offered his own testimony about his restrictions, but Hill argues that Thomas cannot show, with any medical evidence, that he actually has these restrictions. The Court rejects Hill’s arguments.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.).

“During his deposition, [decision-maker] testified that he made the decision not to renew [employee’s] contract because ‘it came down to issues of trust.’  When explaining what issues of trust he had with [employee], [decision-maker] referenced, among other things, [employee’s] report in which she claimed he bumped into her. . . [a]ccordingly, when asked to explain the basis for his decision not to renew her contract, [decision-maker] expressly referenced a grievance [employee] had filed against him.   Although –decision-maker] testified that ‘[i]t wasn’t the issue of the reporting,’ his testimony raises a fact issue as to whether the decision not to renew her contract was caused by her filing the grievance.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 337 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“Here, the alleged termination decision maker repeated (three times) the derogatory racial remark ‘[Plaintiff] didn’t fit into the culture of [Defendant].’  The last time the remark was made was on the day of Plaintiff’s termination.”

Miller v. Kimes & Stone Const. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 4803094, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Sep. 24, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“[T]he absence of any earlier criticism of [Plaintiff’s] work as Board attorney and the manner in which the Board selected [Plaintiff’s] replacement would suggest to a reasonable juror that the Board’s claimed reason for terminating [Plaintiff] was pretext.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir. June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (Barksdale, Prado, and Haynes, JJ.).

“When asked why Plaintiff’s position was eliminated, as opposed to one of the workers in the maintenance department, Childress testified that the District was ‘making decisions based on cost savings.’  Plaintiff points out that none of the other employees laid off as a result of the reduction in force were terminated after the 2010 through 2011 academic year began. Moreover, the District’s contention that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made and finalized on May 26, 2010 strains the credulity of the Court. Specifically, Defendant cites the Board minutes from that date, contending that the minutes contain the names of all employees who were to be employed for the following school year. According to Defendant, ‘[h]ad Plaintiff’s position and his employment continued, then his name would have been on that list.’  The fundamental problem with such a contention, however, is that Plaintiff’s employment did continue both into the next fiscal year and into the next academic year. Additionally, Rutledge, who the District also slated for termination but then continued to employ, is not listed on the Board’s minutes which purportedly contain the names of all 2010 employees.  For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant’s proffered legitimate non-retaliatory reason for his termination was merely pretext for unlawful retaliation.”

 

Newcomb v. Corinth School Dist., 2014 WL 1746066, at *7 (N.D. Miss. May 1, 2014) (Aycock, J.).

“Plaintiff alleges that the workers are ‘hourly employees’ who ‘supply no materials or tools of their own’ and ‘are directly supervised, directed and controlled by [Owner] and [Supervisor].  These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to overcome the instant motion to dismiss.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).