“In the letter itself, Hill raised Thomas’ medical condition, the need for Thomas to seek a less stressful job, and Hill’s desire to reduce costs. Yet, before and after Thomas’ termination, Hill hired a total of three employees to perform Thomas’ job duties. Under these circumstances, Thomas has presented a genuine issue of material fact for trial that Hill’s reasons were pretextual or were, at least in part, false.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.).

“[Direct Supervisor’s] testimony rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] improperly documented her hours on the time sheets. [Direct Supervisor’s] testimony also rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] taking patient files home constituted a privacy violation.” …  “As for [employer’s] allegation that [employee] failed to attend a particular conference and notify her supervisors, [direct-supervisor] testified [that employee] did advise him regarding her inability to attend. He further testified that he did not consider her absence at the conference a disciplinary problem. [Employer] also had pointed to [employee’s] failure to pass a written examination on the new operating procedures that had been implemented. [Direct Supervisor] testified that approximately four employees did not pass the initial examination; however, all the employees, including [employee], eventually passed the test.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 337–38 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“The record shows that Plaintiff’s subordinate made an anonymous complaint against Plaintiff allowing other individuals to steal money and time from Defendant. The subordinate then filed a grievance against Plaintiff complaining that since she was hired for the position he had harassed her, wrote her up, investigated her and yelled at her in front of students. Eleven days later, Plaintiff was terminated. “Considering the evidence of record and the clear contempt that [the subordinate had for [Plaintiff] coupled with the inaction of the administration regarding [the subordinates] complaint of [Plaintiff]’s insubordination, the Court finds that there are questions of material fact of [Plaintiff]’s claim of hostile work environment.”

Prescott v. Board of Sup’rs of the Univ. of Louisiana System, 2014 WL 4825332, at *13 (E.D. La. Sep. 26, 2014) (Roby, J.).

“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

 

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

“The Court finds that [Supervisor]’s unambiguous statement that Plaintiff ‘didn’t do anything wrong, but [he] filed that Complaint,’ recalled by both Plaintiff and a co-worker, amounts to direct evidence of retaliation sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Had [Supervisor] said something more along the lines of, ‘I did not vote to promote you because you filed that Complaint,’ further analysis of whether [Supervisor]’s retaliatory animus infected the rest of the five-member committee would be warranted.But, because the statement was phrased as an omniscient recollection of what took place, it is enough to create a fact issue as to whether retaliatory animus was the but-for cause of [Employee]’s termination.”

 

Rao v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept., 2014 WL 1846102 at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 08, 2014) (Ellison, J.).

“It is undisputed that, prior to [Plaintiff]’s reassignment, he held the position of Branch Chief…, and that, in this position, he supervised a staff of approximately fifteen, consisting of attorneys, paralegals, and a secretary.  It is also undisputed that, after [Plaintiff]’s February 2006 reassignment to the position of staff attorney for the Superfund legal branch, he no longer supervised other EPA employees. The jury could reasonably have found that an involuntary reassignment resulting in the elimination of supervisory responsibilities could dissuade a reasonable worker from asserting a charge of discrimination, and that the involuntary reassignment was an adverse employment action.”

Benton v. U.S. E.P.A., 2014 WL 2862309, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2014) (Fitzwater, J.).

“Where statutory or constitutional provisions create an entitlement to payment, suits seeking to require state officer to comply with the law are not barred by immunity merely because they compel the state to make those payments.  Tamayo claims that Chapter 614 created a statutory requirement that Tamayo continue his employment until Sheriff Lucio complied with the procedures to terminate him.”

Tamayo v. Lucio, 2013 WL 3770914 at *5-6 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi, July 18, 2013, no pet.) (Valdez, Benavides, and Perkes, JJ.).

“Hill also offered at least some legitimate reasons for Thomas’ termination: that Thomas had not indicated if or when he would return and that he had in mind Thomas’ derogatory behavior towards him.  However, those reasons are offset by the contradictory evidence.  Thomas had indicated in his emails to Hill and others that he intended to return to work.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.).

“[T]he evidence shows a conflict regarding [decision-maker’s] stated reasons for not renewing [non-party witness’s] contract. (‘A court may infer pretext where a defendant has provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its conduct.’).”  “According to [non-party witness’s] testimony, when [decision-maker] notified her that that her contract was not being renewed, he said “due to the budget cuts, we’re going to have to let you go.” However, during his deposition, [decision-maker] testified he did not renew [non-party witness’s] contract because he ‘needed a staff position of a higher category according to the HR for the school and that higher category would include a higher level of experience or education background.’”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 336–37 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“During deposition, Plaintiff answered ‘no’ when asked if he was terminated because of his race but later stated that he believed race was a motivating factor in his termination.”

Brooks, et al. v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 2014 WL 4792653, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2014) (Crone, J.).