“Here, the alleged termination decision maker repeated (three times) the derogatory racial remark ‘[Plaintiff] didn’t fit into the culture of [Defendant].’  The last time the remark was made was on the day of Plaintiff’s termination.”

Miller v. Kimes & Stone Const. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 4803094, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Sep. 24, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“The Court held the following to be issues of material fact based on Plaintiff’s and 3rd party affidavits: (1) discrepancy regarding who made the decision to terminate; (2) Plaintiff offering evidence that employees were undermining him while Defendant offers a company policy prohibiting discrimination; (3) Plaintiff’s claims of ‘phenomenal’ performance v. Defendant’s Affidavit’s claiming insubordination,

“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean

“Here, the Plaintiff (white male) used an affidavit to assert that ‘defendant transferred his job responsibilities and authorities to … all African –American[s], and none of whom had anywhere near the experience and training.’”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *4 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“[Plaintiff] claims that the Disciplinary Warning was issued in retaliation for his reporting of Cooper’s racially hostile statements. [Defendant] asserts that the warning issued because Willis demonstrated a ‘lack of good judgment’ and a ‘lack of respect for others’ when he sent the mass email disclosing that his co-worker son overdosed on pills. But [Plaintiff]

“In Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit explained that workplace comments provide sufficient evidence of discrimination if they are ‘1) related [to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member]; 2) proximate in time to the terminations; 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment

“[A]fter the Plaintiff was hired and before she was fired, Wade made an allegation of race discrimination.  Abadilla (age 61 at the time Plaintiff was discharged) was herself implicated in the Wade situation…. [T]hese changed circumstances, primarily Wade’s allegation of race discrimination, render the ‘same actor’ inference inapplicable.”

Bautista v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc

“Plaintiff has presented strong evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [Defendant]’s assertion that [Plaintiff] discriminated against Wade on the basis of [employee]’s race is false.  [Another employee], Director of Human Resources, testified in her deposition that she did not believe that Plaintiff was a racist and that she thinks Plaintiff

“Although Defendant suggests that the remote temporal proximity of the African American hire and Plaintiff’s termination indicate no relation between the two events, such is an inference more properly drawn by the trier of fact.  Thus, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, causing the burden to shift to Defendant to assert