“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

“During deposition, Plaintiff answered ‘no’ when asked if he was terminated because of his race but later stated that he believed race was a motivating factor in his termination.”

Brooks, et al. v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 2014 WL 4792653, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2014) (Crone, J.).

“[Plaintiff] testified that [Supervisor] repeatedly used racial epithets to refer to him, such as ‘güero,’ ‘mayate,’ and ‘ni – –er,’ even after [Plaintiff] requested not to be called those names.  Once, [Supervisor] told [Plaintiff]: ‘Get the f – – k away from me, I don’t want no mayate around while I’m eating.’  In addition, …[Plaintiff]

“Here, the alleged termination decision maker repeated (three times) the derogatory racial remark ‘[Plaintiff] didn’t fit into the culture of [Defendant].’  The last time the remark was made was on the day of Plaintiff’s termination.”

Miller v. Kimes & Stone Const. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 4803094, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Sep. 24, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“The Court held the following to be issues of material fact based on Plaintiff’s and 3rd party affidavits: (1) discrepancy regarding who made the decision to terminate; (2) Plaintiff offering evidence that employees were undermining him while Defendant offers a company policy prohibiting discrimination; (3) Plaintiff’s claims of ‘phenomenal’ performance v. Defendant’s Affidavit’s claiming insubordination,

“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean

“Here, the Plaintiff (white male) used an affidavit to assert that ‘defendant transferred his job responsibilities and authorities to … all African –American[s], and none of whom had anywhere near the experience and training.’”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *4 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“[Plaintiff] claims that the Disciplinary Warning was issued in retaliation for his reporting of Cooper’s racially hostile statements. [Defendant] asserts that the warning issued because Willis demonstrated a ‘lack of good judgment’ and a ‘lack of respect for others’ when he sent the mass email disclosing that his co-worker son overdosed on pills. But [Plaintiff]