“Plaintiff cites her email dated June 6, 2011, in which Plaintiff informed Coughlin-Rowley that she was scheduled for an eye surgery … Plaintiff also points to Coughlin-Rowley’s email exchange with Atkinson on June 7, 2011, wherein Coughlin-Rowley recommended that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated as of July 1, 2011 [specifically referencing] Plaintiff’s intention to undergo surgery in July, as well as her less than ideal performance.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“Pace’s argument to the district court and throughout the trial was that she had five years of “warehouse experience,” if that undefined term was construed broadly, and that “[s]he was the best qualified.”*5 …In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience, and found she did. They could have relied on her presentation of evidence … In addition, the jury received the testimony from Brent Bencaz, Pace’s supervisor, that he believed her to be qualified, and Terry Hughes’s testimony that Pace met the thirteen job criteria that she believed the position required. This testimony proved enough to convince the jury, and nothing in the record suggests that this decision was irrational or unreasonable.”

 

Pace v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 2014 WL 3973059, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (Higginbotham, Clement, and Higginson, JJ.).

“We think it significant that, although [decision-maker] refused to give [employee] any reason when he notified her that her contract was not being renewed, during the instant litigation [decision-maker] was able to supply a laundry list of reasons.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 335 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“Here, the Plaintiff (white male) used an affidavit to assert that ‘defendant transferred his job responsibilities and authorities to … all African –American[s], and none of whom had anywhere near the experience and training.’”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *4 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“The evidence shows that the [P]laintiff submitted a DOTD grievance form on May 24, 2011 regarding alleged improper conduct by [Supervisor] and then provided testimony to the EEOC on July 7, 2011 in connection with complaints filed by two subordinate employees…. Additionally, the evidence indicates that DOTD transferred the [P]laintiff to the Baton Rouge office on September 8, 2011.  The time lapse between the initial grievance and the transfer to Baton Rouge—less than four months—provides the requisite causal connection necessary to make a prima facie showing.”

McKinney v. Louisiana, 2014 WL 2600216, at *4 (M.D. La. June 10, 2014) (Brady, J.).

“In the case at bar, Plaintiff suffered injury on August 2, 2010. Shortly thereafter, Defendant was made aware that Plaintiff had suffered an injury to his arm and would be at least temporarily unavailable for work. Plaintiff provided and continued to provide all relevant medical paperwork to his employer. Plaintiff further informed Defendant that he would be required to exhaust his accrued leave, and Defendant intentionally abstained from informing Plaintiff of his entitlement to FMLA leave. On September 8, Plaintiff was informed by his treating physician that he would be required to undergo a surgical procedure before returning to work. Plaintiff informed his employer, and then had the surgical operation performed on September 16. Although Plaintiff failed to specifically cite his right to leave under the FMLA, Defendant fails to dispute that Newcomb provided notice that he was in need of leave for a serious medical condition, or the anticipated timing and duration of such leave. On September 17, one day after the surgical operation and approximately one week after Plaintiff had exhausted his accrued leave, Plaintiff was terminated. The Court finds the timing between the two events sufficient to satisfy the causal prong of Plaintiff’s prima facie case.”

 

Newcomb v. Corinth School Dist., 2014 WL 1746066, at *6  (N.D. Miss. May 1, 2014) (Aycock, J.).

“In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in a protected activity when she filed a charge with the EEOC, that she was terminated immediately, and that her filing of the charge caused her termination.  Given the proximity of the termination to the charge, it is reasonable to infer at this stage of the litigation that Stewart’s charge caused her termination.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).

“At this stage, should Plaintiffs prevail on their argument that the bonuses were non discretionary and overtime wages were improperly calculated, this finding would be applicable to a class of all operators or riggers.”

Wilson v. Anderson Perforating, Ltd., 2013 WL 3356046 at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 3, 2013) (Rodriguez, J.).

“[Plaintiff] claims that the Disciplinary Warning was issued in retaliation for his reporting of Cooper’s racially hostile statements. [Defendant] asserts that the warning issued because Willis demonstrated a ‘lack of good judgment’ and a ‘lack of respect for others’ when he sent the mass email disclosing that his co-worker son overdosed on pills. But [Plaintiff] has proffered summary judgment evidence sufficient to show a genuine dispute of material fact about whether these stated reasons are pretext for an underlying retaliatory motive. Specifically, Willis references an affidavit from Jerome C. Ardoin, Jr. (“Ardoin”), another Cleco employee, in which Ardoin explains that Melancon, Taylor’s direct supervisor in the Human Resources department, told him that he was ‘very pissed’ with Willis for reporting the conversation with Cooper. Moreover, Ardoin’s affidavit claims that Melancon stated: “If we have to find a reason, Ed [Taylor] and I have decided; we are going to terminate that nigger Greg Willis for reporting me and trying to burn my ass.’ If credited by a trier of fact, this statement fairly indicates that Taylor, whose direct supervisor is Melancon, issued the Disciplinary Warning because of retaliatory intent—that is, because Willis previously engaged in the protected activity of reporting the racially hostile comments Cooper made in a conversation with Melancon. Accordingly, Willis has produced the requisite ‘evidence indicating that the proffered elgitimate nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.’ Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003).”

Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. July 9, 2014) (Garza, J.).

“This Court has previously held that transfers to jail duty, even without a decrease in pay, can be adverse employment decisions because jobs in the jail are not as interesting or prestigious as jobs in the law enforcement section.  We made that finding only after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, and thus we can only make such a finding in this case after further facts have been adduced.  However, it is certainly plausible that a position in the jail is less prestigious or interesting that Cox’s previous position on a DEA task force.  Thus, it is plausible from the facts alleged, including the loss of various benefits, that Cox’s reassignment to the jail was indeed an adverse employment action.”

 

Flex Frac Logistics v. NLRB, 746 F.3d 205, 209 (5th. Cir. March 24, 2014) (Stewart, Higginbotham, and Jones, JJ.) (internal citations omitted).