“[T]he absence of any earlier criticism of [Plaintiff’s] work as Board attorney and the manner in which the Board selected [Plaintiff’s] replacement would suggest to a reasonable juror that the Board’s claimed reason for terminating [Plaintiff] was pretext.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir. June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (Barksdale, Prado, and Haynes, JJ.).

“When asked why Plaintiff’s position was eliminated, as opposed to one of the workers in the maintenance department, Childress testified that the District was ‘making decisions based on cost savings.’  Plaintiff points out that none of the other employees laid off as a result of the reduction in force were terminated after the 2010 through 2011 academic year began. Moreover, the District’s contention that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made and finalized on May 26, 2010 strains the credulity of the Court. Specifically, Defendant cites the Board minutes from that date, contending that the minutes contain the names of all employees who were to be employed for the following school year. According to Defendant, ‘[h]ad Plaintiff’s position and his employment continued, then his name would have been on that list.’  The fundamental problem with such a contention, however, is that Plaintiff’s employment did continue both into the next fiscal year and into the next academic year. Additionally, Rutledge, who the District also slated for termination but then continued to employ, is not listed on the Board’s minutes which purportedly contain the names of all 2010 employees.  For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant’s proffered legitimate non-retaliatory reason for his termination was merely pretext for unlawful retaliation.”

 

Newcomb v. Corinth School Dist., 2014 WL 1746066, at *7 (N.D. Miss. May 1, 2014) (Aycock, J.).

“Plaintiff alleges that the workers are ‘hourly employees’ who ‘supply no materials or tools of their own’ and ‘are directly supervised, directed and controlled by [Owner] and [Supervisor].  These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to overcome the instant motion to dismiss.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).

“[T]he court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a causal connection between her request for FMLA-qualified leave and her termination, which was discussed with her a mere three days after her FMLA-qualified leave request.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“When superintendent Pope informed the school board that an individual needs to be hired because a local organization “expressed concern about a lack of black workers the court held that “discriminatory animus of a manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the decisionmaker acted as a rubber stamp, or the cat’s paw, for the subordinate employee’s prejudice.” Laxton v. GAP Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 584 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The relevant inquiry is whether Pope “had influence or leverage over” the LPSB’s decisionmaking.  See id. The jury could have inferred that Pope had influence or leverage over the LPSB based on Pope’s status as Superintendent and Pope’s acts of calling board members to press his recommendation.”

Pace v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 13-30919, 2014 WL 3973059, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (Higginbotham, Clement, and Higginson, JJ.).

“[I]n her response to [employer’s] motion for summary judgment, [employee] also pointed out that [employer] did not renew the contract of other female employees who had supported [employee’s] complaint during the investigation. . .  [a]s such, the district court’s analysis overlooks [employee’s] reliance on the termination of two other female employees who supported [her] complaint as evidence of pretext.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 336 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“The Court held the following to be issues of material fact based on Plaintiff’s and 3rd party affidavits: (1) discrepancy regarding who made the decision to terminate; (2) Plaintiff offering evidence that employees were undermining him while Defendant offers a company policy prohibiting discrimination; (3) Plaintiff’s claims of ‘phenomenal’ performance v. Defendant’s Affidavit’s claiming insubordination, etc. – all in addition to the reasons stated in the termination letter; (4) Plaintiff’s claims that white employees were purged from the workplace v. Defendant’s claims of having several white administrators.”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *6 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir. June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (Barksdale, Prado, and Haynes, JJ.).

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean the same thing as the power to hire and fire teachers.  The declarant was merely a school principal.  The court found that: “A jury could find that [the declarant] had sufficient influence.”

 

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“In determining if conduct is ‘severe and/or pervasive,’ the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  Stewart v. Caton, Civ. No. 13-823, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.) (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).  Defendants cite to numerous cases to illustrate [their] point, but as [Plaintiff] correctly points out, many of the cases to which Defendants cite may not be relied on because they come from jurisdictions outside of the Fifth Circuit and/or have been overruled.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).