“The Court finds that [Supervisor]’s unambiguous statement that Plaintiff ‘didn’t do anything wrong, but [he] filed that Complaint,’ recalled by both Plaintiff and a co-worker, amounts to direct evidence of retaliation sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Had [Supervisor] said something more along the lines of, ‘I did not vote to promote you because you filed that Complaint,’ further analysis of whether [Supervisor]’s retaliatory animus infected the rest of the five-member committee would be warranted.But, because the statement was phrased as an omniscient recollection of what took place, it is enough to create a fact issue as to whether retaliatory animus was the but-for cause of [Employee]’s termination.”

 

Rao v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept., 2014 WL 1846102 at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 08, 2014) (Ellison, J.).

“It is undisputed that, prior to [Plaintiff]’s reassignment, he held the position of Branch Chief…, and that, in this position, he supervised a staff of approximately fifteen, consisting of attorneys, paralegals, and a secretary.  It is also undisputed that, after [Plaintiff]’s February 2006 reassignment to the position of staff attorney for the Superfund legal branch, he no longer supervised other EPA employees. The jury could reasonably have found that an involuntary reassignment resulting in the elimination of supervisory responsibilities could dissuade a reasonable worker from asserting a charge of discrimination, and that the involuntary reassignment was an adverse employment action.”

Benton v. U.S. E.P.A., 2014 WL 2862309, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2014) (Fitzwater, J.).

“Where statutory or constitutional provisions create an entitlement to payment, suits seeking to require state officer to comply with the law are not barred by immunity merely because they compel the state to make those payments.  Tamayo claims that Chapter 614 created a statutory requirement that Tamayo continue his employment until Sheriff Lucio complied with the procedures to terminate him.”

Tamayo v. Lucio, 2013 WL 3770914 at *5-6 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi, July 18, 2013, no pet.) (Valdez, Benavides, and Perkes, JJ.).

“Hill also offered at least some legitimate reasons for Thomas’ termination: that Thomas had not indicated if or when he would return and that he had in mind Thomas’ derogatory behavior towards him.  However, those reasons are offset by the contradictory evidence.  Thomas had indicated in his emails to Hill and others that he intended to return to work.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.).

“[T]he evidence shows a conflict regarding [decision-maker’s] stated reasons for not renewing [non-party witness’s] contract. (‘A court may infer pretext where a defendant has provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its conduct.’).”  “According to [non-party witness’s] testimony, when [decision-maker] notified her that that her contract was not being renewed, he said “due to the budget cuts, we’re going to have to let you go.” However, during his deposition, [decision-maker] testified he did not renew [non-party witness’s] contract because he ‘needed a staff position of a higher category according to the HR for the school and that higher category would include a higher level of experience or education background.’”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 336–37 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“During deposition, Plaintiff answered ‘no’ when asked if he was terminated because of his race but later stated that he believed race was a motivating factor in his termination.”

Brooks, et al. v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 2014 WL 4792653, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2014) (Crone, J.).

“[Plaintiff] testified that [Supervisor] repeatedly used racial epithets to refer to him, such as ‘güero,’ ‘mayate,’ and ‘ni – –er,’ even after [Plaintiff] requested not to be called those names.  Once, [Supervisor] told [Plaintiff]: ‘Get the f – – k away from me, I don’t want no mayate around while I’m eating.’  In addition, …[Plaintiff] was given extra duties because of his race.  For example, …[Plaintiff] was required to unload a truck by himself while his coworkers looked on.  [Plaintiff’s] boss…stated to his coworkers, ‘Let the mayate unload the bricks by himself.'”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.)

The Plaintiff “was informed that . . . his contract would not be renewed.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court notes that “an employee can prove constructive discharge with evidence that she was given an ultimatum requiring her to choose between resignation and termination.  Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997).”  Id. at *3.  The court found the supervisor’s act of informing Plaintiff that his contract would not be renewed was evidence of an ultimatum: “Lawson was allegedly given the ultimatum to resign or face non-renewal.”

 

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“[W]e agree with Ochoa that the evidence establishes a fact issue as to  and that these opportunities were denied or interfered with based on unlawful criteria… After Ochoa reported sexual harassment to Johnson, he discussed Ochoa’s sexual harassment allegations with … Guerra … Guerra then directed Johnson to end Ochoa’s assignment at UTEP on the grounds that she was not meeting performance standards.”

Ochoa v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 410 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. App.—El Paso, pet filed March 14, 2014).

“After describing statements in an email exchange about terminating plaintiff and how hard on business a sales’ rep’s extended medical leave can be, the court concludes, ‘These statements, in conjunction with Lentin’s testimony [about how the job did not have to be eliminated] and the plain language of the November 19 confidential letter, suggest that … Plaintiff’s continued role as IC manager was not definitely slated to end on July 1, 2011. This evidence, in conjunction with the temporal proximity … is sufficient.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).