“Thomas need only show that Hill terminated him because of his actual or a perceived physical impairment, regardless of whether the impairment limits a major life activity.  Hill’s arguments to the contrary are simply wrong.  Thomas cannot meet his burden, however, if the impairment is “transitory and minor.”  Given the facts in this case, the Court finds that Thomas raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Hill regarded him as having a physical impairment and terminated him because of his impairment.  In Hill’s own letter, he refers to Thomas’ heart condition and the need for Thomas to find a less stressful job.  Further, contrary to Hill’s arguments, the Court cannot say that a heart condition resulting in triple by-pass surgery and rehabilitation is a transitory and minor impairment.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.) (emphasis in original).

“The district court’s belief that Appellees had established beyond dispute that they did not demote Haverda because of his speech has nothing to do with the qualified immunity defense.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“The content—support for Kaelin’s opponent—and form—participation in a PAC—of the speech at issue clearly support the notion that it involved matters of public concern, as we have previously held that there can be no question that . . . associating with political organizations and campaigning for a political candidate related to a matter of public concern.”  At *5 (quotations omitted).

Cox v. Kaelin, — Fed. Appx. –, 2014 WL 3866128, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (Clement, Graves, JJ.).

“[Defendant] argues…that it had an Equal Employment Opportunity policy, the jury could have believed…that the policy was not followed.  At trial, the jury heard evidence that in response to the EEOC’s request for information, [Defendant] produced affidavits stating that [Plaintiff] never complained….  The jury heard and saw evidence and testimony demonstrating that this was false.  [Plaintiff] testified that he had complained….  The jury also heard [a project manager] testify that he was in a hurry when he signed an admittedly false affidavit stating he never used the terms ‘güero’ or ‘wuedo’ in regards to [Plaintiff].”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *4 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

Under the “ultimatum” theory of constructive discharge, a plaintiff “must still show that ‘a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’  Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court rejected the employer’s argument “that [supervisor] lacked authority to make the final determination and that the [School] Board had not voted.”  Id.  Rather, a reasonable employee would be compelled to resign if “told that he would not be renewed.”

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“Here, the district court applied the stray remarks doctrine before determining whether the plaintiff had failed to produce substantial evidence of pretext and then refused to consider those remarks in determining pretext.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 443 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“In the letter itself, Hill raised Thomas’ medical condition, the need for Thomas to seek a less stressful job, and Hill’s desire to reduce costs. Yet, before and after Thomas’ termination, Hill hired a total of three employees to perform Thomas’ job duties. Under these circumstances, Thomas has presented a genuine issue of material fact for trial that Hill’s reasons were pretextual or were, at least in part, false.”

Thomas v. Hill, 2014 WL 3955656, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (James, J.).

“[Direct Supervisor’s] testimony rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] improperly documented her hours on the time sheets. [Direct Supervisor’s] testimony also rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] taking patient files home constituted a privacy violation.” …  “As for [employer’s] allegation that [employee] failed to attend a particular conference and notify her supervisors, [direct-supervisor] testified [that employee] did advise him regarding her inability to attend. He further testified that he did not consider her absence at the conference a disciplinary problem. [Employer] also had pointed to [employee’s] failure to pass a written examination on the new operating procedures that had been implemented. [Direct Supervisor] testified that approximately four employees did not pass the initial examination; however, all the employees, including [employee], eventually passed the test.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 337–38 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“The record shows that Plaintiff’s subordinate made an anonymous complaint against Plaintiff allowing other individuals to steal money and time from Defendant. The subordinate then filed a grievance against Plaintiff complaining that since she was hired for the position he had harassed her, wrote her up, investigated her and yelled at her in front of students. Eleven days later, Plaintiff was terminated. “Considering the evidence of record and the clear contempt that [the subordinate had for [Plaintiff] coupled with the inaction of the administration regarding [the subordinates] complaint of [Plaintiff]’s insubordination, the Court finds that there are questions of material fact of [Plaintiff]’s claim of hostile work environment.”

Prescott v. Board of Sup’rs of the Univ. of Louisiana System, 2014 WL 4825332, at *13 (E.D. La. Sep. 26, 2014) (Roby, J.).

“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

 

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).