“A claim is considered exhausted if is within the scope of the EEOC complaint and reasonably expected to grow out of a charge of discrimination. In examining a Title VII or ADEA action, the Court’s inquiry is not…limited to the exact charge [of discrimination]. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a Title VII plaintiff is not required to check a certain box or recite a specific incantation to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Additionally, EEOC charges are construed broadly and require a fact-intensive analysis.” 2016 WL 3275166, at *2. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

Broussard v. Jazz Casino Co., No. 15-6959, 2016 WL 3275166 (E.D. La. June 15, 2016).

“In light of Pate’s wrongful interpretation and application of its Policy, and its failure to discharge a younger driver with four violations in a two-year period, a reasonable jury could disagree that Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s discharge was the true or real reason for terminating him, and find that the stated reason was pretext for intentional age discrimination. If the Policy had provided that a driver would be classified as unacceptable for being involved in three accidents in any three-year period, this might present a different result as to a genuine dispute of material fact. Perhaps, this is how Pate has historically applied and interpreted the Policy, but such application and interpretation are clearly contrary to its plain language.” 2016 WL 3364995, at *10.

Jones v. Pate Rehab. Endeavors, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-2218-L, 2016 WL 3364995 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2016).

“Citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this court has held that ‘[r]easonable attorney’s fees are mandatory’ when a court finds that an employer has violated § 206.20. Section 216(b) also requires the district court to order the defendant to pay the costs of the action. Although the district court has discretion to determine what is reasonable, the court does not have discretion to decline to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party without making such a determination. The district court did not acknowledge this mandatory requirement or make a finding as to reasonability of the fees.” 2016 WL 3268996, at *7. (alteration in original)(citation omitted).

Steele v. Leasing Enters., Ltd., No. 15-20139, 2016 WL 3268996 (5th Cir. June 14, 2016) (Higginson, J.).


“Unlike credit card issuer fees, which every employer accepting credit card tips must pay, the cost of cash delivery three times a week is an indirect and discretionary cost associated with accepting credit card tips. As the district court noted, this cash delivery was “a business decision, not a fee directly attributable to its cost of dealing in credit.” Moreover, Perry’s deducted an amount that exceeded these total costs—credit card issuer fees and cash-delivery expenses—in nine of the relevant restaurant-years . . . . Allowing Perry’s to offset employees’ tips to cover discretionary costs of cash delivery would conflict with § 203(m)’s requirement that “all tips received by such employee have been retained by the employee” for employers to maintain a statutory tip credit.” 2016 WL 3268996, at *4.

Steele v. Leasing Enters., Ltd., No. 15-20139, 2016 WL 3268996 (5th Cir. June 14, 2016) (Higginson, J.).

“[Defendant] was not acting as AUM’s agent in any respect. Instead, [Defendant] was AUM’s customer. The proper description of the facts here is not that [Defendant] was acting as an agent of AUM, and AUM was passing on legal advice to [Defendant] in the context of a principal-agent relationship; rather, [Defendant] was AUM’s customer, and AUM employees sought legal advice from their legal counsel on questions related to the services AUM was providing to [Defendant], and then shared those opinions in their communications with [Defendant] . . . . The evidence, including the Court’s review of the subject emails, demonstrates that any legal or business advice given by AUM’s in-house counsel was given to AUM’s employees, for the benefit of AUM. AUM’s employees’ decision to share that information with their customer did not extend any privilege that might exist to that customer.” 2016 WL 3211992, at *3.


Schilling v. Mid-America Apartment Cmtys., Inc., No. A-14-CV-1049-LY, 2016 WL 3211992 (W.D. Tex. June 9, 2016).

“[D]espite there being instances, such as in Section 12.1056(d), where an open- enrollment charter school is treated in the same manner as a school district, nothing in the Texas Education Code or the common law dictates that open-enrollment charter schools and school districts are universally equivalent.”

Section 7.057(a)(2)(B) sets forth the process by which a person must appeal to the commissioner a grievance caused by a provision of a written employment contract between the school district and a school district employee. See id. § 7.057(a)(2)(B). But Section 7.057 makes no provision for the inclusion of open-enrollment charter schools, nor does any other section or rule suggest that they should be included under that rule as are school districts. See id.


Azleway Charter School v. Hogue, No. 12-15-00257-CV, 2016 WL 2585963, (Tex. App. – Tyler May 4, 2016)


“[The investigator] testified that a portion of the hours she found Dow to have been overbilled was in the form of employees arriving late, leaving early, and taking breaks. (Id. at pp. 113—15). [The investigator] stated that the contract between Axion and Dow did not permit Axion to bill Dow for its employees’ breaks. (Id.). [The investigator] further testified, and Axion has admitted, that Ms. Miller improperly billed hours to Dow to compensate for her mileage.”


Richardson v. Axion Logistics, LLC, Civil Action No. 13-00302-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 2595105 (M.D. Louisiana, May 4, 2016)


“[Plaintiff] testified that [manager] Young instructed her to refuse [the customer’s] attempted return, and that she was disciplined for doing just that. [Plaintiff] explained that [customer] requested her termination, and that [manager] Young responded “don’t you worry sir. I’m fixing to take care of her right now.” And according to [customer], his complaint to co-manager Copeland was only made at [manager] Young’s behest. This evidence creates a question of fact as to whether Wal-Mart’s asserted reason is “false or ‘unworthy of credence.’” Moss, 610 F.3d at 922 (internal citation and quotation omitted).”

Morris v. Derrick Young, Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., and Steven Lane, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-136-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 2354642 (N.D. Miss., May 3, 2016)


Macy’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., No. 15-60022, 2016 WL 3124847 (5th Cir. June 2, 2016).

Judges: Dennis, Benavides, Costa.

While Macy’s argued that the NLRB disregarded the law when it only certified a portion of one store’s employees, stating that the entire store would be the correct class, the Court nonetheless held that “the Board may certify a unit’ that is appropriate—not necessarily the single most appropriate unit. Although the unit composition argued for by Macy’s may have also been an appropriate bargaining unit we cannot say that the one approved by the NLRB was clearly not appropriate based on the employees community of interests. Macy’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. at *6 (internal quotations omitted).

“Plaintiff merely provides additional facts in her complaint that were not in her EEOC charge. In particular, she identifies the individuals mentioned in her charge who were allegedly promoted over her and who received higher wages for the same work. This is not an issue in which the Plaintiff is attempting to assert wholly new claims and the Court must determine whether the new allegations were reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).


Carasha Isaac v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1660216 (E.D. LA April 27, 2016).

Judge: Karen Wells Roby