Discrimination, Retaliation, Wrongful Termination, and Unpaid Wages
“Moreover, Plaintiffs offer evidence that may call into question whether Tower’s investigation was made in good faith. In Walsh’s first interview with Tower, he admitted that Koopman made statements that he interpreted as racially offensive…. The Tower interviewers doubted Walsh’s credibility and chose to interview him a second time.”
Smith v. Tower Automotive Operations USA I, LLC, 2013 WL 6240247 at *8 (S.D. Miss. December 3, 2013) (Reeves, J.).
“Compelling is the fact that Defendant’s basis for the insubordination charge stems from Plaintiff’s refusal, for arguably legitimate reasons, to sign a form Defendant has not required be signed in the past, and which Defendant had not previously taken any adverse personnel action on account of her failure to sign. That, taken in conjunction with evidence supporting Plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination, gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s justification is creditable or merely pretext for discrimination based on her national origin.”
Garcia v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., No 3:11-cv-502-N-BK, 2013 WL 5299264 at *12 (N.D. Tex Sept. 20, 2013) (Godbey, J.).
“As Dr. Vives alleges putatively harassing acts after February 3, 2009, she may sweep back in all of the harassment that she alleges has occurred during her time at Children’s. It is possible that a jury could conclude the sustained pattern of conduct she alleges constitutes severe and pervasive harassment. It is also possible a jury could conclude this pattern of harassment is on account of one of Dr. Vives’s protected characteristics. And as at least some of this harassment occurred at the hands of Dr. Ellis during the time Dr. Ellis was her supervisor (and as some of the harassment afterwards allegedly occurred at the hands of Dr. Robson, who is now her supervisor), Dr. Vives need not have produced evidence on the fifth element of her hostile work environment claim.”
Vives v. Children’s Hosp., Inc., CIV.A. 11-2080, 2013 WL 5607215 at *15 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2013) (Morgan, J.).
“Plaintiff has presented strong evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [Defendant]’s assertion that [Plaintiff] discriminated against Wade on the basis of [employee]’s race is false. [Another employee], Director of Human Resources, testified in her deposition that she did not believe that Plaintiff was a racist and that she thinks Plaintiff treated Wade differently, but not that she believes Plaintiff treated Wade differently because Wade is African-American.”
Bautista v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 2013 WL 4647677 at *4 (S.D. Tex. August 30, 2013) (Atlas, J.).
“Although Defendant suggests that the remote temporal proximity of the African American hire and Plaintiff’s termination indicate no relation between the two events, such is an inference more properly drawn by the trier of fact. Thus, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, causing the burden to shift to Defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
Garcia v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., No 3:11-cv-502-N-BK, 2013 WL 5299264 at *11 (N.D. Tex Sept. 20, 2013) (Godbey, J.).
“Requesting reasonable accommodations is generally a protected activity against retaliation under the ADA; however, first a plaintiff must have a good faith belief that he or she was disabled or perceived as disabled.”
Williams v. Rocktenn, 2013 WL 5960671 at *14 (W.D. La. November 6, 2013) (Trimble, J.).
“[An employee] sets forth the factors for similarly situated employees as follows: (1) they shared the same supervisor, (2) were subject to the same standards, and (3) engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.”
Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care System, 2014 WL 772672 at *8 (N.D. Tex. February 27, 2014) (Lindsay, J.).
“Section 301 of the Texas Occupations Code provided: ‘[A] person may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or otherwise discipline or discriminate against, a person who reports, without malice, under this section.’ Thus, wrongful termination is not a necessary element for Plaintiffs to assert a claim under section 301. Plaintiffs have alleged that in addition to their terminations, [their supervisor] … retaliated against Plaintiffs … by instituting a bogus criminal complaint, subjecting them to unwarranted and harassing interrogations … and subsequent arrest and criminal prosecutions … [one plaintiff] alleges that … prior to his termination, [his supervisor] subjected him to harassing and unwarranted discipline by transferring him to the graveyard shift …. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have properly alleged a plausible claim for relief for violations of section 301 of the Occupations Code by Smith, and therefore denies [the supervisor]’s motion to dismiss this cause of action.”
Duffie v. Wichita County, 7:13-cv-0032, 2013 WL 6869374 at *17 (N.D. Tex. December 31, 2013) (O’Connor, J.) (internal citations omitted).
“Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she initially chose to leave LHS after Anderson gave her an ultimatum to either follow her directions or clock out, and upon complaining to Ross, he told her not to return to work until he instructed. While there is conflicting evidence of whether Ross promised to pay Plaintiff for her time off and actually followed through on such promise, the Court cannot resolve such a factual dispute in the context of a motion for summary judgment.”
Garcia v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., No 3:11-cv-502-N-BK, 2013 WL 5299264 at *10 (N.D. Tex Sept. 20, 2013) (Godbey, J.).
“The only two documented complaints against De La Cruz are dated February 8, the day she was demoted. Although not incriminating evidence, the suspicious timing of these documents, taken with reasonable inferences in favor of De La Cruz’s claim that they were fabricated, could support a finding of discriminatory motive.”
De La Cruz v. Coastal Bend Reg’l Court Residential Treatment Ctr., 2:12-CV-355, 2013 WL 5744796 at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2013) (Hinojosa, J.).
