“After Lewis disagreed with Wood’s desire to Swafford, Wood repeatedly informed Lewis that he was violating federal law because Lewis was discriminating based on age and disability.  Also the record indicates that Hojem did not make any assurance to Wood regarding retaliation until weeks later—after Wood had already decided to interview Thomas, who he had previously not identified as a qualified applicant.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 445 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Here, [Employee] alleges two statements in particular as evidence of age discrimination. First, [employee] asserts that McKinley, during or immediately after [employee’s] termination, declared: ‘[G]o get a job as a Wal–Mart door greeter.’ Second, [employee] alleges that a fellow employee overheard McKinley say, on the day immediately following [employee’s] termination, ‘I’m the one that got rid of the old bastard.’ Even though [employee] concedes that Bunn was the supervisor who actually fired him, a reasonable juror could conclude, on this record, that McKinley had sufficient authority over the employment decision as well.”

Truelove v. Bolivar County, Miss., 2014 WL 4457314, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sep. 10, 2014) (Biggers, Jr., J.).

“While it is true that these statements are few in number, and that much of the meeting was spent discussing other subjects, their number does not strip the statements of their status as evidence.  After a court draws the negative inference that Sheriff Cutler was negatively referencing Haverda’s letter to the editor, the amount of time spent talking about the subject during the meeting becomes an issue for the fact-finder to weigh.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“He also offered evidence of a history of positive performance reviews, as well as the testimony of Major Robinson … Haverda highlights that the demotion memorandum does not explain how his performance was weaker than that of the other Jail Command Staff members, and that Sheriff Cutler could not explain this distinction during his deposition.  A reasonable jury could consider this evidence, along with Haverda’s other evidence, and find that Appellees failed to show that they would have terminated Haverda in the absence of the protected speech.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 598 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the Court finds that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact from which a jury could conclude that the harassment complained of was based on race.  Such a conclusion is underscored by the deposition testimony of Bell’s white co-worker, who testified that he “never heard [Lane] talk to the white salespeople like the black salespeople.  Definitely.  He never said the same things to us that he would say to the others.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).

“An employer may establish job requirements, and rely on them in arguing that a prima facie case is not established because the employee is not ‘qualified.’  However, only objective requirements may be used in making this argument.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2001)).  “That is, an employer cannot defeat summary judgment at the prima facie stage by claiming the plaintiff failed to meet entirely subjective hiring criteria. Medina, 238 F.3d at 681. …. The police chief requirements at issue have objective and subjective elements.  The vacancy stated, in relevant part, that applicants ‘should have ten years of pertinent experience, including supervisory experience as a division commander, assistant police chief or police chief.’ Doc. [40–6].  While the number of years required is objective, it appears that the City may have been able to make a quasi-subjective determination on whether an applicant’s experience is ‘pertinent.’…. Plaintiff is able to show, and the City does not challenge, that he satisfies the objective hiring criteria for the position.  Such is demonstrated by Plaintiff’s resume and deposition testimony summarizing his work experience and qualifications.”

Harstad v. City of Columbus, Miss., 2014 WL 4913966, at *3–4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“[T]he plaintiff has presented evidence of a pattern of race-based harassment, it is appropriate for the Court to consider incidents of non-race-based harassment. Compare EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (determining that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that a co-worker’s frequent banging on the glass partition of the plaintiff’s office was motivated by animus related to the plaintiff’s national origin because the same co-worker had repeatedly called the plaintiff “Arab” for approximately one year), with Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (declining to consider incidents of harassment not based on race where there was no evidence that the conduct was part of a pattern of race-based harassment). The Court finds that when evidence of Lane and Garafola’s race-based harassment of Bell is taken together with evidence of the non-race-based harassment, it is reasonable to conclude that the harassment complained of was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of Bell’s employment.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *10 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).

“A review of her pleadings reflects that [Employee] has alleged that she has worked for [Employer] since 1988, she encountered no problems in the workplace until she was listed as a witness in [Co-worker]’s complaint in July 2008, and, shortly after being listed as a witness in the legal action [Co-worker] filed in state court against [Employer] in March of 2010, [Employee] was subjected to adverse actions in retaliation for her involvement in the protected activity. At this stage of the litigation, accepting her allegations as true, [Employee] has stated a plausible claim of retaliation against [Employer] under Title VII.”

Slaughter v. College of the Mainland, 2014 WL 1917981, at *5  (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2014) (Froeschiner, J.).

“Defendants cite the following global statement in both declarations: ‘SDT did not fire anyone for complaining about not getting paid for all time worked.’  Neither [Defendant] mentions [Plaintiff] by name, nor do Defendants identify any other evidence to establish the basis for [Plaintiff’s] termination.  The Court finds this evidence insufficient to establish a legitimate, non-retaliatory justification for terminating [Plaintiff’]’s employment.”

Lackey v. SDT Waste and Debris Services, LLC, 2014 WL 3866465, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014) (Milazzo, J.).

“[T]he remarks appear to meet the other requirements of direct evidence.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 444 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).