“Thomas need only show that Hill terminated him because of his actual or a perceived physical impairment, regardless of whether the impairment limits a major life activity.  Hill’s arguments to the contrary are simply wrong.  Thomas cannot meet his burden, however, if the impairment is “transitory and minor.”  Given the facts in this case, the

Under the “ultimatum” theory of constructive discharge, a plaintiff “must still show that ‘a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’  Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court rejected the employer’s argument “that [supervisor] lacked authority

“Here, the district court applied the stray remarks doctrine before determining whether the plaintiff had failed to produce substantial evidence of pretext and then refused to consider those remarks in determining pretext.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 443 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“In the letter itself, Hill raised Thomas’ medical condition, the need for Thomas to seek a less stressful job, and Hill’s desire to reduce costs. Yet, before and after Thomas’ termination, Hill hired a total of three employees to perform Thomas’ job duties. Under these circumstances, Thomas has presented a genuine issue of material fact

“[Direct Supervisor’s] testimony rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] improperly documented her hours on the time sheets. [Direct Supervisor’s] testimony also rebutted [employer’s] reason that [employee] taking patient files home constituted a privacy violation.” …  “As for [employer’s] allegation that [employee] failed to attend a particular conference and notify her supervisors, [direct-supervisor] testified [that employee] did

“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

“It is undisputed that, prior to [Plaintiff]’s reassignment, he held the position of Branch Chief…, and that, in this position, he supervised a staff of approximately fifteen, consisting of attorneys, paralegals, and a secretary.  It is also undisputed that, after [Plaintiff]’s February 2006 reassignment to the position of staff attorney for the Superfund legal branch,

“Hill also offered at least some legitimate reasons for Thomas’ termination: that Thomas had not indicated if or when he would return and that he had in mind Thomas’ derogatory behavior towards him.  However, those reasons are offset by the contradictory evidence.  Thomas had indicated in his emails to Hill and others that he intended

“[T]he evidence shows a conflict regarding [decision-maker’s] stated reasons for not renewing [non-party witness’s] contract. (‘A court may infer pretext where a defendant has provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its conduct.’).”  “According to [non-party witness’s] testimony, when [decision-maker] notified her that that her contract was not being renewed, he said “due to the

“During deposition, Plaintiff answered ‘no’ when asked if he was terminated because of his race but later stated that he believed race was a motivating factor in his termination.”

Brooks, et al. v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 2014 WL 4792653, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2014) (Crone, J.).