“Here, the alleged termination decision maker repeated (three times) the derogatory racial remark ‘[Plaintiff] didn’t fit into the culture of [Defendant].’  The last time the remark was made was on the day of Plaintiff’s termination.”

Miller v. Kimes & Stone Const. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 4803094, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Sep. 24, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“[T]he absence of any earlier criticism of [Plaintiff’s] work as Board attorney and the manner in which the Board selected [Plaintiff’s] replacement would suggest to a reasonable juror that the Board’s claimed reason for terminating [Plaintiff] was pretext.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir.

“When superintendent Pope informed the school board that an individual needs to be hired because a local organization “expressed concern about a lack of black workers the court held that “discriminatory animus of a manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the decisionmaker acted as a rubber stamp, or the cat’s paw, for

“[I]n her response to [employer’s] motion for summary judgment, [employee] also pointed out that [employer] did not renew the contract of other female employees who had supported [employee’s] complaint during the investigation. . .  [a]s such, the district court’s analysis overlooks [employee’s] reliance on the termination of two other female employees who supported [her] complaint

“The Court held the following to be issues of material fact based on Plaintiff’s and 3rd party affidavits: (1) discrepancy regarding who made the decision to terminate; (2) Plaintiff offering evidence that employees were undermining him while Defendant offers a company policy prohibiting discrimination; (3) Plaintiff’s claims of ‘phenomenal’ performance v. Defendant’s Affidavit’s claiming insubordination,

“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean

“Pace’s argument to the district court and throughout the trial was that she had five years of “warehouse experience,” if that undefined term was construed broadly, and that “[s]he was the best qualified.”*5 …In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience,

We think it significant that, although [decision-maker] refused to give [employee] any reason when he notified her that her contract was not being renewed, during the instant litigation [decision-maker] was able to supply a laundry list of reasons.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328,

“Here, the Plaintiff (white male) used an affidavit to assert that ‘defendant transferred his job responsibilities and authorities to … all African –American[s], and none of whom had anywhere near the experience and training.’”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *4 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).