“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient testimony about the positions and relationships between members of the Board….  Those relationships and positions were evidence that suggested the influence [members] with racial animus could exert on the Board such that the Board would be the “cat’s paw” of the actor with discriminatory intent.”

Dulin v. Board of Comm’rs of Greenwood Leflore Hosp., 2014 WL 2595937, at *5 (5th Cir. June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (Barksdale, Prado, and Haynes, JJ.).

Direct evidence requires a statement be “made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.) (citing Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999)).  However, “authority” does not mean the same thing as the power to hire and fire teachers.  The declarant was merely a school principal.  The court found that: “A jury could find that [the declarant] had sufficient influence.”

 

Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).

“In determining if conduct is ‘severe and/or pervasive,’ the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  Stewart v. Caton, Civ. No. 13-823, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.) (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).  Defendants cite to numerous cases to illustrate [their] point, but as [Plaintiff] correctly points out, many of the cases to which Defendants cite may not be relied on because they come from jurisdictions outside of the Fifth Circuit and/or have been overruled.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).

“Plaintiff cites her email dated June 6, 2011, in which Plaintiff informed Coughlin-Rowley that she was scheduled for an eye surgery … Plaintiff also points to Coughlin-Rowley’s email exchange with Atkinson on June 7, 2011, wherein Coughlin-Rowley recommended that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated as of July 1, 2011 [specifically referencing] Plaintiff’s intention to undergo surgery in July, as well as her less than ideal performance.”

Hiltabrand v. Direct Energy, LP, 2013 WL 3480532 at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013) (Lake, J.).

“Pace’s argument to the district court and throughout the trial was that she had five years of “warehouse experience,” if that undefined term was construed broadly, and that “[s]he was the best qualified.”*5 …In light of the ambiguity in the phrase, the jury considered the employer’s argument that Pace did not have the requisite experience, and found she did. They could have relied on her presentation of evidence … In addition, the jury received the testimony from Brent Bencaz, Pace’s supervisor, that he believed her to be qualified, and Terry Hughes’s testimony that Pace met the thirteen job criteria that she believed the position required. This testimony proved enough to convince the jury, and nothing in the record suggests that this decision was irrational or unreasonable.”

 

Pace v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 2014 WL 3973059, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (Higginbotham, Clement, and Higginson, JJ.).

“We think it significant that, although [decision-maker] refused to give [employee] any reason when he notified her that her contract was not being renewed, during the instant litigation [decision-maker] was able to supply a laundry list of reasons.”

Hague v. Univ. of Tx. Health & Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 Fed. Appx. 328, 335 (5th. Cir. March 28, 2014) (Benavides, J.).

“Here, the Plaintiff (white male) used an affidavit to assert that ‘defendant transferred his job responsibilities and authorities to … all African –American[s], and none of whom had anywhere near the experience and training.’”

Quinn v. Capital Transp. Corp., 2014 WL 4782708, at *4 (M.D. La. Sep. 24, 2014) (De Gravelles, J.).

“The evidence shows that the [P]laintiff submitted a DOTD grievance form on May 24, 2011 regarding alleged improper conduct by [Supervisor] and then provided testimony to the EEOC on July 7, 2011 in connection with complaints filed by two subordinate employees…. Additionally, the evidence indicates that DOTD transferred the [P]laintiff to the Baton Rouge office on September 8, 2011.  The time lapse between the initial grievance and the transfer to Baton Rouge—less than four months—provides the requisite causal connection necessary to make a prima facie showing.”

McKinney v. Louisiana, 2014 WL 2600216, at *4 (M.D. La. June 10, 2014) (Brady, J.).

“In the case at bar, Plaintiff suffered injury on August 2, 2010. Shortly thereafter, Defendant was made aware that Plaintiff had suffered an injury to his arm and would be at least temporarily unavailable for work. Plaintiff provided and continued to provide all relevant medical paperwork to his employer. Plaintiff further informed Defendant that he would be required to exhaust his accrued leave, and Defendant intentionally abstained from informing Plaintiff of his entitlement to FMLA leave. On September 8, Plaintiff was informed by his treating physician that he would be required to undergo a surgical procedure before returning to work. Plaintiff informed his employer, and then had the surgical operation performed on September 16. Although Plaintiff failed to specifically cite his right to leave under the FMLA, Defendant fails to dispute that Newcomb provided notice that he was in need of leave for a serious medical condition, or the anticipated timing and duration of such leave. On September 17, one day after the surgical operation and approximately one week after Plaintiff had exhausted his accrued leave, Plaintiff was terminated. The Court finds the timing between the two events sufficient to satisfy the causal prong of Plaintiff’s prima facie case.”

 

Newcomb v. Corinth School Dist., 2014 WL 1746066, at *6  (N.D. Miss. May 1, 2014) (Aycock, J.).

“In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in a protected activity when she filed a charge with the EEOC, that she was terminated immediately, and that her filing of the charge caused her termination.  Given the proximity of the termination to the charge, it is reasonable to infer at this stage of the litigation that Stewart’s charge caused her termination.”

Stewart v. Caton, 2013 WL 4459981, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2013) (Barbier, J.).