“[The] declarations and timesheets [produced by Plaintiff] establish that there were weeks in which [Defendant’s] employees worked more than forty hours, and [two employees] both state in their declarations that they were not paid an overtime rate for this work. . . . [N]othing in [another employee’s] declaration refutes Plaintiff’s claim that employees often worked over forty hours a week and were not paid time-and-a-half for those hours. [That employee] states only that she felt that her ‘pay was fair and acceptable’ and that it was her choice to work more than forty hours a week. . . . [That employee’s] declaration, then, does not in any way create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether [Defendant] failed to meet the overtime requirements of the FLSA.” 2016 WL 5122123, at *4

McDaniel v. Family Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4031-KS, 2016 WL 5122123 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2016).

“The only other argument Defendants make as to this issue is to point out that the evidence presented by Plaintiff only speaks to the overtime claims of [two other employees], and does not establish the claims of Plaintiff herself or the other employees she represents in the collective action. . . . Such a collective action ‘functions like a class action under Rule 23 in that it provides a judicial mechanism for the efficient resolution of the claims of multiple plaintiffs that involve common factual issues on the basis of representative proof.’ It is sufficient, then, that Plaintiff has put forward representative proof as to the liability of [Defendant] under the overtime violation claim.” 2016 WL 5122123, at *4 (citation omitted).

McDaniel v. Family Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-4031-KS, 2016 WL 5122123 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2016).

“Therefore, because Defendants have pointed only to her lack of evidence, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiff must adduce evidence that goods or materials she or the collective plaintiffs she represents handled or worked on during their employment with [Defendant] moved in or were produced for interstate commerce. [Plaintiff] has put forward evidence to show that some of the equipment she and other employees used during their employment at [Defendant] included goods and materials, such as polysomnography equipment and nasal airflow sensors, that were manufactured outside of the state of Texas and moved in the stream of interstate commerce. Based on this evidence, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” 2016 WL 5122123, at *3-4 (emphasis in original).

McDaniel v. Family Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-4031-KS, 2016 WL 5122123 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2016).

“[D]espite there being instances, such as in Section 12.1056(d), where an open- enrollment charter school is treated in the same manner as a school district, nothing in the Texas Education Code or the common law dictates that open-enrollment charter schools and school districts are universally equivalent.”

“Section 7.057(a)(2)(B) sets forth the process by which a person must appeal to the commissioner a grievance caused by a provision of a written employment contract between the school district and a school district employee. See id. § 7.057(a)(2)(B). But Section 7.057 makes no provision for the inclusion of open-enrollment charter schools, nor does any other section or rule suggest that they should be included under that rule as are school districts. See id.”

 

Azleway Charter School v. Hogue, No. 12-15-00257-CV, 2016 WL 2585963, (Tex. App. – Tyler May 4, 2016)

 

“[The investigator] testified that a portion of the hours she found Dow to have been overbilled was in the form of employees arriving late, leaving early, and taking breaks. (Id. at pp. 113—15). [The investigator] stated that the contract between Axion and Dow did not permit Axion to bill Dow for its employees’ breaks. (Id.). [The investigator] further testified, and Axion has admitted, that Ms. Miller improperly billed hours to Dow to compensate for her mileage.”

 

Richardson v. Axion Logistics, LLC, Civil Action No. 13-00302-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 2595105 (M.D. Louisiana, May 4, 2016)

 

“[Plaintiff] testified that [manager] Young instructed her to refuse [the customer’s] attempted return, and that she was disciplined for doing just that. [Plaintiff] explained that [customer] requested her termination, and that [manager] Young responded “don’t you worry sir. I’m fixing to take care of her right now.” And according to [customer], his complaint to co-manager Copeland was only made at [manager] Young’s behest. This evidence creates a question of fact as to whether Wal-Mart’s asserted reason is “false or ‘unworthy of credence.’” Moss, 610 F.3d at 922 (internal citation and quotation omitted).”

Morris v. Derrick Young, Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., and Steven Lane, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-136-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 2354642 (N.D. Miss., May 3, 2016)

 

Macy’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., No. 15-60022, 2016 WL 3124847 (5th Cir. June 2, 2016).

Judges: Dennis, Benavides, Costa.

While Macy’s argued that the NLRB disregarded the law when it only certified a portion of one store’s employees, stating that the entire store would be the correct class, the Court nonetheless held that “the Board may certify a unit’ that is appropriate—not necessarily the single most appropriate unit. Although the unit composition argued for by Macy’s may have also been an appropriate bargaining unit we cannot say that the one approved by the NLRB was clearly not appropriate based on the employees community of interests. Macy’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. at *6 (internal quotations omitted).

“Plaintiff merely provides additional facts in her complaint that were not in her EEOC charge. In particular, she identifies the individuals mentioned in her charge who were allegedly promoted over her and who received higher wages for the same work. This is not an issue in which the Plaintiff is attempting to assert wholly new claims and the Court must determine whether the new allegations were reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).

 

Carasha Isaac v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1660216 (E.D. LA April 27, 2016).

Judge: Karen Wells Roby

“Plaintiff states during her employment she was paid less than her male counterparts with equal or less experience. She cites three examples: (1) an unidentified male employee, who worked at the vision center for a month longer than her, told her that he made two dollars more per hour; (2) an unidentified male employee made four dollars more per hour when he was in the manager training program; and (3) after she became a salaried employee a male employee named Chris, whose last name is unknown, was making six thousand more than her.” Carasha Isaac v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1660216, *4 (E.D. LA April 27, 2016). “Based on the above case law, the Plaintiff has sufficiently plead facts to inform the Defendant of the claims she intends to pursue.” Id.

 

Carasha Isaac v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1660216 (E.D. LA April 27, 2016).

Judge: Karen Wells Roby

 

“Heffernan’s supervisors demoted Heffernan from detective to patrol officer and assigned him to a “walking post.” In this way they punished Heffernan for what they thought was his “overt involvement” in Spagnola’s campaign.” Heffernan v. City of Paterson, New Jersey, et al., 2016 WL 1627953 *3 (2016). “In a word, it was the employer’s motive, and in particular the facts as the employer reasonably understood them, that mattered….Here the employer mistakenly thought that the employee had engaged in protected speech. If the employer’s motive (and in particular the facts as the employer reasonably understood them) is what mattered in Waters, why is the same not true here? After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.” Id. at *5.

 

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, New Jersey, et al., 2016 WL 1627953 (2016).

Justice Breyer