“With regard to the letter, [Plaintiff]’s allegation is that he asked Chief Justice Jefferson to keep the letter confidential, not that Chief Justice Jefferson actually did so. In fact, [Defendant alleged that Chief Justice Jefferson did not answer the letter himself, establishing that the letter had not remained confidential. With regard to the disciplinary complaint,
Austin Campbell
When pleading knowledge, it is enough to plead simply that the bad actor knew and this this precipitated the bad acts.
“[Plaintiff was not required to allege how [Defendant] knew of the letter and complaint, only that [Defendant] knew. Having done so, he has sufficiently pleaded that his letter and his disciplinary complaint precipitated [Defendant]’s allegedly untoward conduct.” Anderson, 2016 WL 6647759, at *5 (footnotes omitted).
A plaintiff’s own assertions about his official job duties can plausibly establish that his actions were outside the course and scope of his job duties.
“In the context of Garcetti‘s clear instruction, [Plaintiff]’s letter and disciplinary complaint were not created pursuant to his official duties. It is useful to note that [Plaintiff]’s supervisor, Vela, did not ask him, much less require him, to send the letter or to file the disciplinary complaint. [Plaintiff] expressly alleged that he did so…
Parties’ conduct can show whether or not a reasonable accommodation offer was ever made.
“[Defendant] contends that it twice offered [the employee] a reasonable accommodation in the form of clerical work, which offers she ignored or rejected. This first offer was undisputedly made, but made at a time when [she] was unable to return to work and on FMLA leave. [The employee] declined the offer on the advice of…
An application for benefits under a disability policy stating that the claimant is “totally disabled” does not preclude them from claiming they could perform their job with reasonable accommodation if they never represented otherwise on their application and the definition of “disability” in the policy is not incompatible with that fact.
“[The employee’s] claim that she was temporarily totally disabled for the purposes of private disability benefits is not inconsistent with the claim that she could work if provided an accommodation. . . . [Plaintiff argued that] the definition of ‘qualified individual’ in the ADA was not incompatible with the definition of ‘disabled’ within the…
A written job description put forth by the employer is not dispositive of job duties at summary judgment in the face of testimony that the job duties were not actually required.
“[Defendant] also contends that a written job description in this case establishes that the essential functions of [the employee’s] duties include lifting and pushing more than ten pounds. While written job descriptions warrant deference, ‘this deference is not absolute,’ and we must ask ‘whether the employer actually requires employees in the position to perform the…
A claimant’s own testimony about job duties may be self-serving, but that does not disqualify it as competent summary judgment.
“At oral argument, counsel for [Defendant] suggested we reject the [Plaintiff]’s evidence as self-serving. But this is summary judgment, and we may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, — F. App’x —, 2016 WL 5939424, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016) (internal citations
An employee’s testimony that she could not remember ever performing a particular job duty, alongside other testimony that it was “virtually never required,” creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was an essential function of the job.
“‘Fact-finders must determine whether a function is ‘essential’ on a case-by-case basis.’ [The employee] testified she couldn’t ‘remember having to lift more than 10 pounds’ as part of her duties, and her colleague . . . has provided a detailed affidavit that, if true, establishes that such exertions are virtually never required. While [Defendant]’s witnesses…
An employee being seven months into her pregnancy, coupled with her supervisor’s awareness of her pregnancy and consequent FMLA leave request, is enough to raise a genuine dispute of material fact whether she was terminated because of the leave request.
“The Defendants also claims [sic] that the Plaintiff could not satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case [for FMLA retaliation] and could not establish a causal connection that her pregnancy caused her to get fired. The Defendants contend that there is no indication [Defendant] was aware that the Plaintiff was pregnant or wanted…
In a collective FLSA action, an employee’s testimony that they worked overtime voluntarily and were satisfied with their pay does not create a genuine dispute of material fact when other employees were indisputably denied overtime wages.
“[The] declarations and timesheets [produced by Plaintiff] establish that there were weeks in which [Defendant’s] employees worked more than forty hours, and [two employees] both state in their declarations that they were not paid an overtime rate for this work. . . . [N]othing in [another employee’s] declaration refutes Plaintiff’s claim that employees often worked…