Race Discrimination

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“A reasonable jury could conclude from [plaintiff’s supervisor’s] explanation, together with the summary judgment evidence that Plaintiff’s’ co-worker, Clark, also did not strictly follow TDCJ’s timesheet policy as written, that [employer’s] timesheet policy recognized a de facto exception for [public information officers].  If the de facto exception was selectively ignored in [plaintiff’s] case, a reasonable…

“Kelvin Williams, a black male, was elected sheriff.  James Moore, a black male, became warden.  Shortly thereafter, Williams promoted another black female, with no college degree or counseling certification, to be the director of the male alcohol and drug program at the facility at a salary of $40,000 per year.  He appointed Jean Fair, a…

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the Court finds that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact from which a jury could conclude that the harassment complained of was based on race.  Such a conclusion is underscored by the deposition testimony of Bell’s white co-worker,…

“[T]he plaintiff has presented evidence of a pattern of race-based harassment, it is appropriate for the Court to consider incidents of non-race-based harassment. Compare EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (determining that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that a co-worker’s frequent banging on the glass…

“Plaintiff argues that the changes to the vacancy notice regarding college graduation indicate the City’s true intent, which he claims was to hire a black police chief.  Plaintiff contends that the vacancy initially required applicants to graduate from a four-year university or college but was later changed so that African–Americans would qualify. ….  Plaintiff further…

Under the “ultimatum” theory of constructive discharge, a plaintiff “must still show that ‘a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’  Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319.”  Lawson v. Hinds County School Dist., 2014 WL 373199 *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2014) (Jordan, J.).  The court rejected the employer’s argument “that [supervisor] lacked authority…

“In addition to [Plaintiff’s] supervisor’s name-calling and harassment, [Plaintiff’s] coworkers testified that they too frequently called him ‘güero.’  This racial harassment occurred for over a year, despite [Plaintiff’s] complaint to management.”

Rhines v. Salinas Const. Technologies, Ltd., 2014 WL 2872716, at *3 (5th Cir. June 25, 2014) (unpublished) (Davis, Barksdale, and Elrod, JJ.).

“During deposition, Plaintiff answered ‘no’ when asked if he was terminated because of his race but later stated that he believed race was a motivating factor in his termination.”

Brooks, et al. v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 2014 WL 4792653, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2014) (Crone, J.).

“[Plaintiff] testified that [Supervisor] repeatedly used racial epithets to refer to him, such as ‘güero,’ ‘mayate,’ and ‘ni – –er,’ even after [Plaintiff] requested not to be called those names.  Once, [Supervisor] told [Plaintiff]: ‘Get the f – – k away from me, I don’t want no mayate around while I’m eating.’  In addition, …[Plaintiff]…