“In the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that (a) they are members of a protected class; (b) they were subjected to intentional discriminatory treatment during their employment with SLU; (c) similarly situated white employees were treated differently; (d) they were terminated due to their race; (e) Gandolfo was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was willfully

“McMullin learned of the vacancy from the officer previously holding the position. ‘The standard procedure for applying for an open position…was to send a letter of interest after learning of an available position. So, McMullin submitted her letter of interest on February 27, 2012. It was Colonel Berry’s policy to ignore letters like Lieutenant McMullin’s

“[T]he district court compared [Plaintiff] to similarly situated employees within the same protected class—i.e., those with religious observances.  But, the proper comparators are ‘similarly situated employees outside the protected class.’”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *6 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J.) (emphasis added) (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport,

“While the district court cites cases for the propositions made by an applicant and has no duty to verify information, it is worth noting that Thomas was not even asked about his education during the interview.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 446(5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson,

“A reasonable jury could conclude from [plaintiff’s supervisor’s] explanation, together with the summary judgment evidence that Plaintiff’s’ co-worker, Clark, also did not strictly follow TDCJ’s timesheet policy as written, that [employer’s] timesheet policy recognized a de facto exception for [public information officers].  If the de facto exception was selectively ignored in [plaintiff’s] case, a reasonable

“[P]laintiff arranged for a substitute who voluntarily agreed to work [Plaintiff]’s shift that Sunday…. With a volunteer substitute available, [Defendant] would not have had to incur any cost requiring an employee to substitute for [Plaintiff], nor would [Defendant] necessarily be left short-handed.”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *7 (5th Cir.

“As we have noted, while a showing that a plaintiff is clearly better qualified is one way of demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, it is not the only way … the question is whether the assessment, even if incorrect, was the real reason for the action.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co.,

“Kelvin Williams, a black male, was elected sheriff.  James Moore, a black male, became warden.  Shortly thereafter, Williams promoted another black female, with no college degree or counseling certification, to be the director of the male alcohol and drug program at the facility at a salary of $40,000 per year.  He appointed Jean Fair, a

“A showing of sincerity, however, does not require proof that the July 3rd church event was itself a true religious tenet, but only that [Plaintiff] sincerely believed it to be religious in her own scheme of things.”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *4 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J.) (citing Moussazadeh

“After Lewis disagreed with Wood’s desire to Swafford, Wood repeatedly informed Lewis that he was violating federal law because Lewis was discriminating based on age and disability.  Also the record indicates that Hojem did not make any assurance to Wood regarding retaliation until weeks later—after Wood had already decided to interview Thomas, who he had