“Kelvin Williams, a black male, was elected sheriff.  James Moore, a black male, became warden.  Shortly thereafter, Williams promoted another black female, with no college degree or counseling certification, to be the director of the male alcohol and drug program at the facility at a salary of $40,000 per year.  He appointed Jean Fair, a black female, to be assistant director, with a $35,000 salary.  Plaintiff, who was forced to reapply for her position with the new sheriff, formally requested a raise but was declined despite the fact that the raise would be fully funded by federal monies and would cost Bolivar County nothing….  The court finds that the plaintiff has set forth genuine issues of material fact including, but not limited to, whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her race in failing to pay her comparably to similarly-situated black employees.”

Lyons v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 2014 WL 4413259, at *1 (5th Cir. Sep. 9, 2014) (Davis, Dennis, and Costa, JJ.).

“In the interrogatories, Plaintiff states that Wood called him a “wetback”on five different occasions: (1) April 21, 2008; (2) May 29, 2008; (3) June 21, 2008; (4) July 10, 2008; and (5) August 8, 2008. Wood also told Plaintiff that “Salvadorans are liars” on July 8, 2008. Given the number of times these racial comments were made in a short, five-month period, the court determines that these actions amount to more than simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, and that a genuine dispute of material fact is established as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.”

Vasquez v. Johnson, 2014 WL 2438380, at * 17 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2014) (Lindsay, J.).

“A showing of sincerity, however, does not require proof that the July 3rd church event was itself a true religious tenet, but only that [Plaintiff] sincerely believed it to be religious in her own scheme of things.”  Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2014 WL 4209371 at *4 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J.) (citing Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Davis v. Fort Bend County, — F.3d –, 2014 WL 4209371, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2014) (Prado, J.).

“After Lewis disagreed with Wood’s desire to Swafford, Wood repeatedly informed Lewis that he was violating federal law because Lewis was discriminating based on age and disability.  Also the record indicates that Hojem did not make any assurance to Wood regarding retaliation until weeks later—after Wood had already decided to interview Thomas, who he had previously not identified as a qualified applicant.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 445 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“Here, [Employee] alleges two statements in particular as evidence of age discrimination. First, [employee] asserts that McKinley, during or immediately after [employee’s] termination, declared: ‘[G]o get a job as a Wal–Mart door greeter.’ Second, [employee] alleges that a fellow employee overheard McKinley say, on the day immediately following [employee’s] termination, ‘I’m the one that got rid of the old bastard.’ Even though [employee] concedes that Bunn was the supervisor who actually fired him, a reasonable juror could conclude, on this record, that McKinley had sufficient authority over the employment decision as well.”

Truelove v. Bolivar County, Miss., 2014 WL 4457314, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sep. 10, 2014) (Biggers, Jr., J.).

“While it is true that these statements are few in number, and that much of the meeting was spent discussing other subjects, their number does not strip the statements of their status as evidence.  After a court draws the negative inference that Sheriff Cutler was negatively referencing Haverda’s letter to the editor, the amount of time spent talking about the subject during the meeting becomes an issue for the fact-finder to weigh.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“He also offered evidence of a history of positive performance reviews, as well as the testimony of Major Robinson … Haverda highlights that the demotion memorandum does not explain how his performance was weaker than that of the other Jail Command Staff members, and that Sheriff Cutler could not explain this distinction during his deposition.  A reasonable jury could consider this evidence, along with Haverda’s other evidence, and find that Appellees failed to show that they would have terminated Haverda in the absence of the protected speech.”

Haverda v. Hays Co., 723 S.W.3d 586, 598 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (Martinez, J.).

“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the Court finds that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact from which a jury could conclude that the harassment complained of was based on race.  Such a conclusion is underscored by the deposition testimony of Bell’s white co-worker, who testified that he “never heard [Lane] talk to the white salespeople like the black salespeople.  Definitely.  He never said the same things to us that he would say to the others.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).

“An employer may establish job requirements, and rely on them in arguing that a prima facie case is not established because the employee is not ‘qualified.’  However, only objective requirements may be used in making this argument.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2001)).  “That is, an employer cannot defeat summary judgment at the prima facie stage by claiming the plaintiff failed to meet entirely subjective hiring criteria. Medina, 238 F.3d at 681. …. The police chief requirements at issue have objective and subjective elements.  The vacancy stated, in relevant part, that applicants ‘should have ten years of pertinent experience, including supervisory experience as a division commander, assistant police chief or police chief.’ Doc. [40–6].  While the number of years required is objective, it appears that the City may have been able to make a quasi-subjective determination on whether an applicant’s experience is ‘pertinent.’…. Plaintiff is able to show, and the City does not challenge, that he satisfies the objective hiring criteria for the position.  Such is demonstrated by Plaintiff’s resume and deposition testimony summarizing his work experience and qualifications.”

Harstad v. City of Columbus, Miss., 2014 WL 4913966, at *3–4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014) (Brown, J.).

“[T]he plaintiff has presented evidence of a pattern of race-based harassment, it is appropriate for the Court to consider incidents of non-race-based harassment. Compare EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (determining that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that a co-worker’s frequent banging on the glass partition of the plaintiff’s office was motivated by animus related to the plaintiff’s national origin because the same co-worker had repeatedly called the plaintiff “Arab” for approximately one year), with Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (declining to consider incidents of harassment not based on race where there was no evidence that the conduct was part of a pattern of race-based harassment). The Court finds that when evidence of Lane and Garafola’s race-based harassment of Bell is taken together with evidence of the non-race-based harassment, it is reasonable to conclude that the harassment complained of was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of Bell’s employment.”

Bell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925682, at *10 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (Jackson, J.); see also Postell v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925665 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Thompson v. Lane, 2014 WL 4925622 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014).