“A reasonable juror could find that Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s request because Plaintiff was terminated thirty-two (32) hours after his refusal to include Bible quotes in the Morning Coffee[name of daily email].” Mindrup v. Goodman Networks, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-157, 2015 WL 5996362, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2015).  Based upon this finding, the Court held that the refusal to include bible verses in a daily company wide email “is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s explanation is not the true reason for Plaintiff’s discharge, but rather pretext for religious discrimination.” Id. at *10.

 

Mindrup v.Goodman Networks, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-157, 2015 WL 5996362 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2015) (Mazzant, J.)

Thus, in certain situations, an employee’s wages may include “the reasonable cost, as determined by the Administrator, to the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or other facilities.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(m).  However, such reasonable cost of lodging can only be computed when determining the employee’s regular rate of pay, such as when assessing whether the employee’s regular rate comports with the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements; it is not to be considered payment for overtime wages.  Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-0588-B, 2015 WL 5052241 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2015)

 

Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-0588-B, 2015 WL 5052241 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2015) (Boyle)

“The employment contract does not constitute a gratuitous payment of public funds to Morales. The contract clearly serves a legitimate public purpose—the employment of the District’s general manager. The benefit received in return by the District under the contract is the performance by Morales of the duties of general manager. The ‘severance’ required for early termination of the contract by the District was a term that was negotiated by the parties, presumably to achieve that end. ‘A political subdivision’s paying public money is not ‘gratuitous’ if the political subdivision receives return consideration.’” 2015 WL 5655802, at *3 (quoting Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. 2002)).

 

Morales v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 6, No. 13-14-00205-CV, 2015 WL 5655802 (Tex App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 24, 2015) (Perkes, J.) (Benavides, Perkes, & Longoria).

“Although this evidence on its own likely would not support an inference of pretext, a rational juror could conclude that [Defendant’s] failure to re-hire these employees on a full-time basis further weakens the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered rationale for not hiring [Plaintiff], thus buttressing a reasonable inference that the failure to rehire [Plaintiff] was based on her age.” Id. at 12, See, e.g., Pratt v. City of Hous., 247 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir.2001) (reversing summary judgment in favor of employer because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to pretext in light of multiple pieces of evidence presented by plaintiff, including “allegations that [supervisor] discriminated in favor of white applicants on other occasions”).

 

 

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)

“[W]e have recognized that subjective hiring criteria “ ‘provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination’ because the criteria itself may be pretext for age discrimination.” Id. at 11, citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.1993)).

 

 

 

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)

“This court has held that an employer’s reliance on “previously unmentioned” job requirements can raise a “genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.” Id. at 11, citing Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir.2010). Plaintiff was able to point to evidence that the “proffered reason for hiring [an] Assistant Principal was…his background in “STEM” (i.e., science, technology, engineering, and math)…, but that such qualifications were nowhere listed in the job posting. Similarly,…the hiring decisions for other positions were purportedly based largely on qualifications nowhere listed in the job postings or preferences: Tupelo Middle School Assistant Principal (experience teaching history and language arts and with guidance counseling), Lawhon Administrative Intern (prior experience at the school where students leaving Lawhon would move next), High School Advancement Academy Lead Teacher (math teaching experience), Tupelo High School Testing Coordinator (ability to understand the accountability system and help teachers understand data), District Testing Coordinator (math certification, experience as assistant principal at high school, and assistance with high school testing).”

 

 

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)

“Although…individual principals had the ultimate power to decide whom to interview, the record nevertheless supports a finding that the individual principals conferred in deciding not to interview [Plaintiff].” Id. at 10.

 

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]…we conclude that a jury reasonably could determine that it was not a mere coincidence that [Plaintiff] was denied interviews for the vast majority of these positions notwithstanding her exemplary qualifications, pertinent experience, and excellent performance reviews, particularly where some of the principals indisputably conferred in their decision-making process and where the superintendent [who gave final approval] was clearly aware of [Plaintiff’s] interest in the available positions.” Id. at 10.

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)

“With regard to the assistant principal and administrative intern positions,…[Plaintiff] not only possessed two certifications in school…but also had worked in a supervisory administrative capacity…for many years. [Plaintiff’s] prior experience as an administrator was corroborated through the testimony…. Further, with regard to the “lead teacher” and “testing coordinator” positions, the evidence showed that [Plaintiff] had prior experience as a “lead teacher”…, and that one of her duties…had been to serve as the school’s “on-site test coordinator/assistant test coordinator.” Id. at *9

 

“[W]e previously have recognized that an employer’s failure to interview a candidate can “help carry [plaintiff’s] burden” of proving pretext. Id. at *9, citing Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Miss., 686 F.2d 1144, 1153–54 (5th Cir.1982).

 

“A reasonable jury could consider the strength of [Plaintiff’s] qualifications vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale—i.e., that the younger successful applicants were selected because they were all better qualified than her. Indeed, evidence of a plaintiff’s superior qualifications is directly probative of pretext, Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187, and [Plaintiff] need not establish that she was “clearly better qualified” in order for this court to consider her comparatively exemplary qualifications in tandem with the other evidence, outlined infra, supporting the inference that [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale is pretextual. Id. at *9.

 

“[E]vidence showed that, measured in terms of education and experience, [Plaintiff] was more qualified than each of the successful younger applicants, except one…. For example, [Defendant]…select[ed]…a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and twenty-three fewer years of teaching experience than [Plaintiff]. [Defendant] also selected a substantially younger candidate…who had only an AA certification and only half the years of overall teaching experience as [Plaintiff]. Similarly, [Defendant]…hired a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and ten years of teaching experience. Defendant also hir[ed] a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and seven years of overall experience.”

 

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)

“A reasonable jury could consider the strength of [Plaintiff’s] qualifications vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale—i.e., that the younger successful applicants were selected because they were all better qualified than her. Indeed, evidence of a plaintiff’s superior qualifications is directly probative of pretext, Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187, and [Plaintiff] need not establish that she was “clearly better qualified” in order for this court to consider her comparatively exemplary qualifications in tandem with the other evidence, outlined infra, supporting the inference that [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale is pretextual. Id. at *9.

 

“[E]vidence showed that, measured in terms of education and experience, [Plaintiff] was more qualified than each of the successful younger applicants, except one…. For example, [Defendant]…select[ed]…a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and twenty-three fewer years of teaching experience than [Plaintiff]. [Defendant] also selected a substantially younger candidate…who had only an AA certification and only half the years of overall teaching experience as [Plaintiff]. Similarly, [Defendant]…hired a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and ten years of teaching experience. Defendant also hir[ed] a substantially younger applicant with only an AA certification and seven years of overall experience.”

 

Stennett v. Tupelo Public School Dist., 2015 WL 4569205 (5th Cir. 2015)