“The company document notes that Huske’s termination was involuntary and attributed to a permanent layoff.  There is absolutely no other reason given for her termination on the form.  In box 21, Tyson could have stated that she just couldn’t operate in the gray area, she didn’t smile enough, she was just too blunt, or she ‘ruffled too many feathers.’  Tyson could have also put this in the Comments section of the form, but that portion of the form is blank and no additional reason for her ‘separation’ is given.  The absence of additional reasons or information demonstrates the fact issue as to pretext here.”

Huske v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 4:12CV583, 2013 WL 5832248 at *7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2013) (Bush, J.).

“Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in support of her claim….  She has presented evidence that Davide Penninger, an IT Department Manager, believed Plaintiff could be best utilized as a member of the SAP team and, therefore, returned her to the team.  Penninger was precluded from doing so and reluctantly removed her from the SAP team.”

Nguyen v. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, 2013 WL 4506001 at *3 (S.D. Tex. August 22, 2013) (Atlas, J.).

“Chevron’s failure to conduct even the most cursory investigation, confront Ion about Peel’s statements, or seek a second opinion under the FMLA calls into doubt Chevron’s reasonable reliance and good faith on Peel’s statements, and, at the very least, creates a fact issue as to whether it would have terminated Ion despite its retaliatory motive.”

Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. September 26, 2013) (Guirola, Jr., J.).

“When it is alleged that bigoted remarks are laughed at by fellow employees and managers, even when those remarks are not directed at the plaintiff, it becomes more likely the plaintiff will show pretext.”

Rideout v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2013 WL 6061330 at *6 (N.D. Miss. November 18, 2013) (Mills, J.).

 

 

“So long as a plaintiff meets the ‘minimal’ initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, she is entitled to a presumption of discrimination….  Although the precise elements of this showing will vary depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of the case is not onerous.”

Hall v. RDSL Enterprises, LLC, 2014 WL 656843 at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, no pet.  February 20, 2014) (Gardner, Meier, and Gabriel, JJ.).

“Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were nonexempt, regularly worked more than forty hours per week, and were not paid time-and-a-half to be factual allegations and not legal conclusions.”

Rodriguez v. Gold & Silver Buyers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:12–CV–1831, 2013 WL 5372529 at *3 (S.D.Tex. Sept.24, 2013) (Harmon, J.).

“Here, Ion has offered an e-mail written by General Manager Melcher, in which Melcher references Ion’s attempt to exercise his FMLA rights and asks Ion’s supervisor, Ogborn, for ‘options.’  The temporal proximity between when the e-mail was sent, when Peel came forward with Ion’s alleged statements, when Ion was asked to come to the clinic to sign a medical records release, and when Ion was terminated is noteworthy and raises serious questions about Chevron’s motives for terminating Ion.”

Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. September 26, 2013) (Guirola, Jr., J.).

“Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.”

Huske v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 4:12CV583, 2013 WL 5832248 at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2013) (Bush, J.).

“Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in support of her claim…. Plaintiff has presented evidence that after execution of the Settlement Agreement, all managerial responsibilities included in her job description were removed.”

Nguyen v. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, 2013 WL 4506001 at *3 (S.D. Tex. August 22, 2013) (Atlas, J.).

“While it is true that Chevron disciplined Ion for his absences and poor performance prior to his application for FMLA leave, it is also true that Chevron’s disciplinary response for these actions had already been determined. Chevron’s claim that it would have fired him based on his absences and poor performance is disingenuous and contradicted by the evidence.”

Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 392 (5th Cir. September 26, 2013) (Guirola, Jr., J.).