“With regard to the letter, [Plaintiff]’s allegation is that he asked Chief Justice Jefferson to keep the letter confidential, not that Chief Justice Jefferson actually did so. In fact, [Defendant alleged that Chief Justice Jefferson did not answer the letter himself, establishing that the letter had not remained confidential. With regard to the disciplinary complaint,
Employee Rights
When pleading knowledge, it is enough to plead simply that the bad actor knew and this this precipitated the bad acts.
“[Plaintiff was not required to allege how [Defendant] knew of the letter and complaint, only that [Defendant] knew. Having done so, he has sufficiently pleaded that his letter and his disciplinary complaint precipitated [Defendant]’s allegedly untoward conduct.” Anderson, 2016 WL 6647759, at *5 (footnotes omitted).
A plaintiff’s own assertions about his official job duties can plausibly establish that his actions were outside the course and scope of his job duties.
“In the context of Garcetti‘s clear instruction, [Plaintiff]’s letter and disciplinary complaint were not created pursuant to his official duties. It is useful to note that [Plaintiff]’s supervisor, Vela, did not ask him, much less require him, to send the letter or to file the disciplinary complaint. [Plaintiff] expressly alleged that he did so…
In a collective FLSA action, an employee’s testimony that they worked overtime voluntarily and were satisfied with their pay does not create a genuine dispute of material fact when other employees were indisputably denied overtime wages.
“[The] declarations and timesheets [produced by Plaintiff] establish that there were weeks in which [Defendant’s] employees worked more than forty hours, and [two employees] both state in their declarations that they were not paid an overtime rate for this work. . . . [N]othing in [another employee’s] declaration refutes Plaintiff’s claim that employees often worked…
To win summary judgment on the issue of whether overtime requirements were violated, the plaintiff in a certified collective FLSA action only has to show that some employees have claims, not necessarily all employees or even themselves.
“The only other argument Defendants make as to this issue is to point out that the evidence presented by Plaintiff only speaks to the overtime claims of [two other employees], and does not establish the claims of Plaintiff herself or the other employees she represents in the collective action. . . . Such a collective…
Employees’ use of goods and materials produced outside the state as part of their jobs creates a a genuine dispute of material fact whether their employer is an “enterprise engaged in interstate commerce” under the FLSA.
“Therefore, because Defendants have pointed only to her lack of evidence, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiff must adduce evidence that goods or materials she or the collective plaintiffs she represents handled or worked on during their employment with [Defendant] moved in or were produced for interstate commerce. [Plaintiff] has put forward evidence to show that…
Certifying only part of a store can satisfy the Community Interest Test.
Macy’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., No. 15-60022, 2016 WL 3124847 (5th Cir. June 2, 2016).
Judges: Dennis, Benavides, Costa.
While Macy’s argued that the NLRB disregarded the law when it only certified a portion of one store’s employees, stating that the entire store would be the correct class, the Court nonetheless held…
Plaintiffs may be conditionally certified if they have a similar pay scheme despite having different jobs
Defendant contended that “the facts of this case are “unsuited for resolution via the FLSA’s collective action mechanism” because of the differences in the individual work and pay histories as well as the fact that each class member must show that Dauterive managers had actual or constructive knowledge that overtime qualifying work was being performed…
In a failure to hire case, three advanced degrees; four administrative and teaching certifications; thirty-eight years of educational experience overall; twenty years of experience within the school district; and experience directly pertinent to the position in comparison to other applicants is directly probative of pretext.
“A reasonable jury could consider the strength of [Plaintiff’s] qualifications vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale—i.e., that the younger successful applicants were selected because they were all better qualified than her. Indeed, evidence of a plaintiff’s superior qualifications is directly probative of pretext, Patterson, 491 U.S.…
Plaintiff’s stronger qualifications can by itself create pretext in a failure to hire case. No “clearly better qualified” analysis required
“A reasonable jury could consider the strength of [Plaintiff’s] qualifications vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale—i.e., that the younger successful applicants were selected because they were all better qualified than her. Indeed, evidence of a plaintiff’s superior qualifications is directly probative of pretext, Patterson, 491 U.S.…
