This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying Loyds of Dallas Enterprises, LLC’s motion to dismiss an alleged health care liability claim (HCLC) for failure to file an expert report. … Jennings alleges she was fired for reporting violations of the health and safety code consisting of failures by Loyds to make adequate medication and food available for residents. After the time expired for filing an expert report, Loyds moved to dismiss Jennings’s suit, arguing her claim was an HCLC and she failed to file an expert report as required by Section 74.351 of the civil practice and remedies code. The trial court denied the motion. In a single issue on appeal, Loyds argues Jennings’s claim is an HCLC under the supreme court’s holding in PH Management–Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets, 404 S.W.3d 550 (Tex.2013) (per curiam).

Loyds of Dallas Enterprises, LLC v. Jennings, 2016 WL 718573 (Tex. App. – Dallas Feb. 23, 2016, no pet.h).

 

Plaintiff’s earnings prior to her employment with Defendant are not relevant to this cause of action. Therefore, the temporal scope of the financial information relevant to Plaintiff’s case is limited to the time period during and after her employment with Defendant. Because Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in June of 2014, only Plaintiff’s earnings (and other financial information) between 2014 and the present are relevant and discoverable.

 

Williams v. United States Environmental Services, WL 684607 (M.D. La.) February 18, 2016

Plaintiffs allege that Rite–Way was an enterprise covered by the FLSA because (1) its employees handled materials such as “mops, brooms, towels, soap, chemicals, vacuum cleaners, and other cleaning materials, supplies, and equipment” that had moved in interstate commerce, and (2) its annual gross volume of sales exceeded $500,000.Therefore, as held persuasively by the Eleventh Circuit, if an employer has employees “handling, selling, or otherwise working on … materials,” the employer would be subject to the FLSA if it satisfied the $500,000 sales volume requirement also.

 

Reyes v. Rite-Way Janitorial Service, Inc., WL 625064 (S.D. Tex.) February 16, 2016

Plaintiff contends that she “was succeeded by one or more of three new male MEs and so was replaced by someone outside her protected class.” There is evidence that Defendant had “three temporary or agency MEs” but didn’t know if they were actually hired and was not sure of their race. Defendant argues that evidence this does not show that Plaintiff was replaced by a person outside the protected class. The Court finds that this uncertainty regarding whether or not Plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class presents a genuine issue of material fact.

 

Hardy v. Caterpillar Global Mining Equipment, WL 659150 (E.D. Tex.) February 18, 2016

These statements are clearly sexual in nature and are significantly less ambiguous than the “jealousy” remark that the court relied on in La Day. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Salinas, a reasonable jury could conclude that Castillo’s sexually charged comments and inappropriate touching of Salinas indicate legitimate sexual desire.

 

Salinas testified that he was aware Castillo had a wife and multiple children and that Castillo had spoken about his extramarital affairs with women.  Salinas also noted that Castillo would make remarks when an attractive female customer would come in the store and…had once made a crude sexual comment about a female co-worker.  In light of this evidence, a jury may conclude that Castillo intended to harass Salinas but did not act out of genuine sexual desire for him.  It is the jury’s role, however, to weigh the evidence and to make that determination….

 

Salinas v. Kroger Texas, L.P., Civil Action No. H-14-3153, 2016 WL 561178 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2016)

We conclude that Vallejo met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. The only evidence offered, TVC’s evidence, showed that Vallejo, age sixty, was replaced by someone who—although at fifty-one within the protected class—was “substantially younger.” See Agoh, 992 F.Supp.2d at 740. TVC did not present evidence negating these facts. See Mendoza, 441 S.W.3d at 343. TVC also did not dispute that Vallejo was qualified for his position. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 642. Because Vallejo established a prima facie case of age discrimination, TVC waived its immunity to suit as to that claim and the trial court did not err by denying TVC’s plea to the jurisdiction as to Vallejo’s age discrimination claim.

 

Texas Veterans Commission v.
Armando Lazarin, Jose Vallejo
and Robert Muse, No. 13–15–00045–CV, 2016 WL 552117 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 11, 2016)

Defendant contended that “the facts of this case are “unsuited for resolution via the FLSA’s collective action mechanism” because of the differences in the individual work and pay histories as well as the fact that each class member must show that Dauterive managers had actual or constructive knowledge that overtime qualifying work was being performed by each member.” Id. at 6 (internal quotation omitted). Nonetheless, the Court held that the “act that there may be some differences between Plaintiffs and the proposed class, including, but not limited to, the potential for varying amounts of damages, does not preclude conditional certification. Courts have repeatedly stressed that Plaintiffs must only be similarly—not identically—situated to proceed collectively.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court went on to further state that “[c]onditional certification is appropriate when there is a demonstrated similarity among the individual situations … [and] some factual nexus which binds the named plaintiffs and the potential class members together as victims of a particular alleged [policy or practice]. Whether employees are “similarly situated” for purposes of the FLSA is determined in reference to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Busby v. Dauterive Contractors, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-03366, 2016 WL 430608 (W.D. LA 2016)(Whitehurst, J.).

In this case, Crawford moved for summary judgment on December 16, 2015—less than two months after the case was initiated. The Court has yet to issue a scheduling order or conduct an initial case management conference. Additionally, the parties have not yet begun discovery—on the issue presented in the motion or any other. (“The [parties] have yet to conduct any discovery.”). Granting summary judgment not just before discovery has been completed, but before it has even begun on this issue, would be premature.

 

George v. Go Frac, LLC (W.D. Tex 2016) WL 94146

Under these alleged facts, Wade has established a prima facie case for purposes of summary judgment. The Court disagrees with Home Depot that, under these alleged circumstances, Wade was required to apply through Career Depot. Although Home Depot did have a formal application process and Wade failed to follow that process, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wade, as the Court must, a jury could find that Lebeouf, an assistant manager, apparently involved in the interview process,4 purposely misled her after she had inquired about the position. Wade indeed “sought” the promotion, but Lebeouf’s actions, combined with the lack of notice in the break room, denied her the opportunity to apply and interview for the position.

 

Charmine Wade v. The Home Depot USA, Inc. AKA The Home Depot (W.D. La. 2016) WL 67793

“[A] repeated pattern of behavior consisting of sexual comments, humiliating jokes, insults, ridicule, and intimidation. Clark claimed she was subjected to continuous repeated sexual jokes and obscene language, most of which were directed at her” and although “it could be argued that most of the acts complained of by Clark were not objectively severe,3 the repeated nature of the comments and jokes over an almost two-year period was most certainly pervasive.” Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 2015 WL 6163252, *5 (Ct. of App. San Antonio, Oct. 21, 2015).

 

Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 2015 WL 6163252, (Ct. of App. San Antonio, Oct. 21, 2015). (Judge Pozza)