Defendant contends that even if there was a common illegal policy, the suit cannot proceed as a collective action because Defendant will assert defenses that require individualized analysis for each putative class member (Dkt. #22 at p. 12). Challenges in litigating the suit or a particular need to address each perspective member of the collective

Plaintiff offers testimony that he performed the duties of a mortgage loan officer working for Defendant . . . . Plaintiff provides declarations of other individuals who claim the same primary job duty. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the “same pay practice” is Defendant failing to pay loan officers compensation tied to actual hours worked, denying

“The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim is supported by direct evidence, based upon her conversation with Mr. Nowzaradan, wherein he stated she was not promoted to the development department due to his concern that she would be sexually harassed there. While Defendants offered evidence to rebut this conclusion, it is not

“While Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, she complained to her supervisors that she should be paid as an employee, rather than an independent contractor, because she was treated as an employee. (Id. ¶ 26.) Subsequently, Defendants offered to extend the contracts of every other coordinating producer besides Plaintiff who had worked on the fifth season

“The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff successfully made a prima facie case, and that Defendants articulated a non-discriminatory reason for their failure to extend Plaintiff’s contract by stating she was unhappy producing Shipping Wars, shifting the burden back to Plaintiff. (Dkt. # 52 at 5.) The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff raised a genuine issue

Plaintiffs allege that Rite–Way was an enterprise covered by the FLSA because (1) its employees handled materials such as “mops, brooms, towels, soap, chemicals, vacuum cleaners, and other cleaning materials, supplies, and equipment” that had moved in interstate commerce, and (2) its annual gross volume of sales exceeded $500,000.

Therefore, as held persuasively by the

Plaintiff contends that she “was succeeded by one or more of three new male MEs and so was replaced by someone outside her protected class.” There is evidence that Defendant had “three temporary or agency MEs” but didn’t know if they were actually hired and was not sure of their race. Defendant argues that evidence

Plaintiff’s earnings prior to her employment with Defendant are not relevant to this cause of action. Therefore, the temporal scope of the financial information relevant to Plaintiff’s case is limited to the time period during and after her employment with Defendant. Because Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in June of 2014, only Plaintiff’s earnings (and

Despite the fact that the employer posted an arbitration agreement with a 30 day opt out clause the Court held “that is a gamble every employer takes any time it foregoes an employee signature and instead hangs its hat on a fact finder’s determination of whether it met Halliburton ‘s notice requirements.” The Court further

Even if the attorney-client or work-product privileges were to apply, Herzing waived the privileges by asserting the Faragher-Ellerth defense. When a Title VII defendant affirmatively invokes a Faragher-Ellerth defense that is premised at least in part on an internal investigation, the defendant waives the attorney-client privilege and work- product doctrine for all documents created as