“[The] declarations and timesheets [produced by Plaintiff] establish that there were weeks in which [Defendant’s] employees worked more than forty hours, and [two employees] both state in their declarations that they were not paid an overtime rate for this work. . . . [N]othing in [another employee’s] declaration refutes Plaintiff’s claim that employees often worked

“The only other argument Defendants make as to this issue is to point out that the evidence presented by Plaintiff only speaks to the overtime claims of [two other employees], and does not establish the claims of Plaintiff herself or the other employees she represents in the collective action. . . . Such a collective

“Therefore, because Defendants have pointed only to her lack of evidence, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiff must adduce evidence that goods or materials she or the collective plaintiffs she represents handled or worked on during their employment with [Defendant] moved in or were produced for interstate commerce. [Plaintiff] has put forward evidence to show that

A violation is willful if the employer ‘either knew or showed reckless disregard for…whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.’ Plaintiff claims Defendant acted willfully and intentionally because Defendant knew of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements, yet ‘recklessly failed to investigate’ whether its payroll practices were in accordance with the FLSA. The

“Defendant also argues the Complaint should be dismissed because it does not identify a week during which Plaintiff worked more than forty hours and was not properly compensated for overtime. The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded his overtime claim. He alleged that he worked on average seventy hours per week from December 3,

“When evaluating whether settlements purporting to waive or release claims pursuant to the FLSA may be enforced, courts look to evidence in the records before them to see whether the settlements resolved ‘bona fide disputes’ regarding the number of allegedly unpaid hours or compensation due at the time that payment was received. By contrast, here,

“Citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this court has held that ‘[r]easonable attorney’s fees are mandatory’ when a court finds that an employer has violated § 206.20. Section 216(b) also requires the district court to order the defendant to pay the costs of the action. Although the district court has discretion to determine what is reasonable,

“Unlike credit card issuer fees, which every employer accepting credit card tips must pay, the cost of cash delivery three times a week is an indirect and discretionary cost associated with accepting credit card tips. As the district court noted, this cash delivery was “a business decision, not a fee directly attributable to its cost

Defendant contended that “the facts of this case are “unsuited for resolution via the FLSA’s collective action mechanism” because of the differences in the individual work and pay histories as well as the fact that each class member must show that Dauterive managers had actual or constructive knowledge that overtime qualifying work was being performed

“‘Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.’ Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant itself has offices in four states and five countries. In addition, PetroMar’s business involves shipping in the oil and maritime industry, and its employees were sent to work on