“In light of Pate’s wrongful interpretation and application of its Policy, and its failure to discharge a younger driver with four violations in a two-year period, a reasonable jury could disagree that Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s discharge was the true or real reason for terminating him, and find that the stated reason was pretext

“Although this evidence on its own likely would not support an inference of pretext, a rational juror could conclude that [Defendant’s] failure to re-hire these employees on a full-time basis further weakens the credibility of [Defendant’s] proffered rationale for not hiring [Plaintiff], thus buttressing a reasonable inference that the failure to rehire [Plaintiff] was based

“[W]e have recognized that subjective hiring criteria “ ‘provide opportunities for unlawful discrimination’ because the criteria itself may be pretext for age discrimination.” Id. at 11, citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.1993)).

 

 

Stennett v. Tupelo

“While the district court cites cases for the propositions made by an applicant and has no duty to verify information, it is worth noting that Thomas was not even asked about his education during the interview.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 446(5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson,

“As we have noted, while a showing that a plaintiff is clearly better qualified is one way of demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, it is not the only way … the question is whether the assessment, even if incorrect, was the real reason for the action.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co.,

“After Lewis disagreed with Wood’s desire to Swafford, Wood repeatedly informed Lewis that he was violating federal law because Lewis was discriminating based on age and disability.  Also the record indicates that Hojem did not make any assurance to Wood regarding retaliation until weeks later—after Wood had already decided to interview Thomas, who he had

“Here, [Employee] alleges two statements in particular as evidence of age discrimination. First, [employee] asserts that McKinley, during or immediately after [employee’s] termination, declared: ‘[G]o get a job as a Wal–Mart door greeter.’ Second, [employee] alleges that a fellow employee overheard McKinley say, on the day immediately following [employee’s] termination, ‘I’m the one that got

“[T]he remarks appear to meet the other requirements of direct evidence.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 444 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).

“There is no dispute that Lewis was Wood’s direct supervisor and was responsible for Wood’s performance evaluations and implementation of disciplinary actions…. Woods pay and any raises were merit-based and dependent on performance reviews done by Lewis.  There is additional evidence … that Lewis had refused to communicate with Wood and had removed some of

“Here, the district court applied the stray remarks doctrine before determining whether the plaintiff had failed to produce substantial evidence of pretext and then refused to consider those remarks in determining pretext.”

E.E.O.C. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Ops. Co., 537 Fed. Appx. 437, 443 (5th Cir. July 26, 2013) (Davis, Graves, and Higginson, JJ.).