“[Plaintiff] has put forth modest evidence that her job has changed, that she has been excluded from meetings, and that her pay may have been affected. Collectively, these occurrences rise to the level of a Title VII ‘adverse employment action.’” Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll., No.

“[T]he Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff cannot show that she ‘sought’ any position. Defendant itself states that ‘the positions . . . are not positions for which an individual may apply, and applications are neither sought nor accepted for said positions.’” Hernandez v. City of Corpus Christi, 820 F. Supp. 2d 781, 797

“Here, there is no evidence that [Plaintiff] is physically limited by his prosthetic leg. His only need is to be able to readjust his prosthetic leg every so often so that it does not break his skin or fall off. Therefore, if Plaintiff were given the breaks he requested, the issues involved with his prosthesis

“[T]he job description states that the supervisor ‘may perform manual labor’ . . . . Just because . . . the supervisor sometimes ‘may perform’ such labor does not override the consideration that the ability to perform physical labor is not an essential or even mandatory component of the supervisor’s job. Therefore, [Plaintiff]’s inability to

A job description listed essential functions as including “frequent lifting and carrying up to 20 lbs., occasionally lifting and carrying 20-35 lbs., and occasionally lifting up to 40 lbs.,” as well as “occasionally . . . up to 200 pounds with the assistance of co-workers or Hoyer lift.” Molina, 840 F. Supp. 2d at

“Despite the coaching plan being bogus, Plaintiff satisfied all requirements of the initial coaching plan. However, [supervisor] never took Plaintiff off of the plan. Instead, he extended it . . . and moved Plaintiff to a PIP almost immediately after the extended coaching plan ended. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s conduct clearly was calculated to

“The City requires that the SRO position must be filled by a full-duty officer authorized to use a firearm. A General Order issued by the City of Royse requires officers to undergo firearms qualification twice each year. The State of Texas only requires officers to undergo firearms qualification once each year . . . .”

“It was not until after [Plaintiff] . . . brought to [employer]’s attention that he had a Texas Teachers Certificate that [employer] reconsidered the propriety of qualifying an instructor based on a Texas Teachers Certificate. At that point, [employer] determined that a Texas Teachers Certificate is not the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree. The issue