“[Plaintiff] can establish the third prima facie element, that she was subjected to an adverse action based on her disability, because [employer] readily admits that [Plaintiff] was terminated because she was unable to return to work without lifting restrictions at the time her FMLA leave expired.” Molina, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.

“[Plaintiff] claims that [supervisor] gave her an ultimatum that, in effect, forced her to miss her regularly-scheduled physical therapy session in order to keep her job. Specifically, [Plaintiff] was told that if she missed the upcoming Wednesday for therapy, or any day for that matter, she would be fired. This allegation is sufficient[] . .

“Plaintiff was suspended without pay. Therefore, the suspension affected her compensation, and it qualifies as an adverse employment action in the Title VII discrimination context.” Brown v. Prentiss Reg’l Hosp., CIV. A. 2:11-CV-180-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 610520, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2013) (emphasis supplied).

“[T]he summary judgment evidence supports an inference that the [new position] is ‘objectively worse’ than the [original] position . . . .” Petrie, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 584. “Plaintiff further attests that the duties associated with the [new] position were more dangerous than those performed” in his original position. Id. His new duties

“[T]he summary judgment evidence supports an inference that the [new position] is ‘objectively worse’ than the [original] position . . . .” Petrie v. City of Grapevine, 904 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (N.D. Tex. 2012). Plaintiff’s original position “operated on a regular Monday-through-Friday schedule, with weekends and holidays off. By contrast, as a